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Reformist Momentum in Mexico: A US View
by Alexander F. Watson

would like to highlight that
im proved relations with Mex
ico parallel a fundam ental
change in the overall relations
o f the US with Latin America.
After a difficult decade o f eco
nom ic reversals, the region has im
plem ented far-reaching political
and econom ic reform s that have
contributed to an econom ic up
turn that has attracted investors
worldwide. Mexico has led the way
on many o f these initiatives and we
are confident that the im plem enta
tion of the N orth Am erican Free
Trade A greem ent (NAFTA) will
open up fu rth er opportunities for
investment, while adding to our ca
pacity to export to its growing do
mestic market.
At the same time, the uprising
in Chiapas illustrated the serious
challenges Mexico and o ther coun
tries in the region face in address
ing the still unresolved issues of
poverty and lack o f opportunity for
im portant sectors o f society. The
legitim ate grievances of the people
o f southern Mexico were neither
caused by NAFTA, nor should
NAFTA be in any way com pro
mised by these developments.
Indeed, the events in Chiapas
dem onstrated m ore clearly than
ever the need for NAFTA.
With NAFTA, Mexico will con
tinue on the path o f free-m arket re
form, providing the private sector

AlexanderF. Watson is US assistant
secretary of state. This article was ex
cerpted from testimony before the House
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere
Affairs, February 2, 1994. It was de
livered before the March 1994 assassi
nation of the Partido Revolucionario
Institucional's official presidential
candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio.
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with strong incentives to energize
the country’s economy and attract
foreign investment. With NAFTA,
Mexico will be drawn fu rth er into
the W estern com m unity o f nations,
a com m unity in which free-m arket
reform s are closely linked with the
political legitimacy that stems from
open, free, and dem ocratic politics.
The US is confident that the Mexi
can governm ent has responded to
the situation in Chiapas in a forth
com ing and responsible way. We
hope that developm ents since the
Chiapas uprising will further en
hance dem ocratic reform , rather
than jeopardize it.

Chiapas, Economic Reforms,
and NAFTA
While the problem s of Chiapas date
back centuries, recent changes in
the Mexican and global econom ies
have certainly contributed to social
upheaval in southern Mexico. As
the Mexican governm ent has in
stituted financial, econom ic, and
trade reform s— steps that we have
seen as crucial to long-term growth
and stability— there have been
shocks to its economy, particularly
to those sectors that were ineffi
cient or protected from com peti
tion. In Chiapas, 58% o f the
population is d ep en d en t upon
agriculture for its livelihood. Gov
ern m en t efforts to m odernize the
agricultural sector through land re
form and changes in support pro
grams, coupled with worldwide
declines in com m odity prices for
some of the state’s m ain crops,
have im pacted significantly on this
sizeable segm ent o f the Chiapas
economy. Chiapas has been tar
geted by the Salinas governm ent to
receive a large share o f funds from
governm ent program s designed to

provide for a social safety net d ur
ing the period o f econom ic reform .
O ne of the m ost significant as
pects of the econom ic reform s of
the Salinas adm inistration has been
the successful conclusion of NAFTA.
NAFTA entered into force on Jan u 
ary 1 and has begun to perm anently
alter the trading patterns of N orth
America. T he opening o f the Mexi
can economy will increase overall
econom ic efficiency and growth,
but that growth will benefit some
regions m ore than others at the
outset. It is up to the Mexican gov
ernm ent to best use its fiscal and
social policies to redistribute the
benefits o f growth to include re
gions o f slower growth. The Mexi
can governm ent understands this
need and is com m itted to increase
its social expenditures in Chiapas.
T he first phase o f NAFTA im ple
m entation is fully u n d er way. Re
ports indicate that it is proceeding
with few difficulties. Amb. Jim Jones
reports that our embassy and con
sulates are being inundated with
inquiries from US businessm en
and wom en seeking inform ation
on doing business in Mexico. The
inaugural m eeting o f the NAFTA
Commission was held in Mexico
City on January 14 and addressed a
num ber o f crucial im plem entation
issues, including the creation o f the
NAFTA secretariat. Representatives
from the D epartm ents o f State and
Labor and the Environm ental Pro
tection Agency continue to work
with their Mexican and Canadian
counterparts on organizing the
commissions required in the labor
and environm ent supplem ental
agreem ents and the B order Envi
ronm ental C ooperation Agreement.
In their initial “declaration of
war,” the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (EZLN) deem ed

N
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NAFTA the death knell for the In
dians of Chiapas. I do no t accept
th at judgm ent. Such a statem ent is
little m ore than EZLN rhetoric that
makes for catchy headlines. The
EZLN itself claims to have been
preparing for its “war” for some
10 years—obviously long before
NAFTA was on the table.
NAFTA is n o t the cause o f the
social and econom ic inequalities in
Chiapas that spawned the uprising
any m ore than NAFTA can be
blam ed for poverty o r social ten
sions elsewhere in Mexico or the
rest of N orth America. NAFTA
only becam e operational on Jan u 
ary 1, 1994. But make no mistake
about the expectations o f the Clin
ton adm inistration. NAFTA by it
self is n o t viewed as the panacea to
those problem s. As the majority of
econom ic studies project, NAFTA
will increase trade and investm ent
flows am ong the partners and stim
ulate the econom ies of all three.
This will lead to jo b creation and al
low for m ore balanced developm ent
th ro u g h o u t Mexico. To quote Spe
cial Trade Representative Mickey
Kantor from rem arks m ade at the
January 14 inaugural session o f the
NAFTA Commission: “T he idea of
NAFTA is to raise standards of liv
ing, to increase economies, to make
all of N orth America m ore com 
petitive. T hat creates jobs, [and]
the ability of all three countries to
create jobs and to raise their stand
ards of living obviously addresses
grievances th at many have in all
three countries.”
As it comes into full im plem enta
tion, NAFTA will bring some dislo
cations to segments of the economies
of all three NAFTA partners. It has
been suggested th at corn producers
in Mexico—corn is a primary crop
in Chiapas—will suffer dispropor

A
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tionately from NAFTA’s opening of
the Mexican m arket to cheaper
and m ore efficiently produced US
corn. T he im portance of corn pro
duction to the Mexican economy
was taken into consideration in
NAFTA as witnessed in the long
phase-in period of the corn provi
sions: 15 years, almost a generation.

NAFTA is not the
cause of the social and
economic inequalities in
Chiapas that spaxxmed
the uprising any more
titan NAFTA can be
blamed fo r poverty
or social tensions
elsewhere in Mexico.
In addition, the Salinas adminis
tration announced in O ctober of
1993 a new incom e support pro
gram for subsistence farmers, in
cluding corn growers, known as
PROCAMPO. It will provide direct
incom e support to farmers who gen
erally have no t benefited from past
Mexican price support programs.
At the same time, it is designed to
be phased out over the 15 years
scheduled for NAFTA im plem en
tation. In 1994 alone, the Mexican
governm ent will spend $3.5 billion
on PROCAMPO nationwide.
F urtherm ore, the NAFTA proc
ess is m ore than a closer linking of
our trading patterns. This process
accelerates a com prehensive inte
gration o f o u r two countries in
many areas. It helps energize local

Y

nongovernm ental organizations
(NG O’s) and forges links between
them and like-minded NG O ’s in
the international community. The
process increases Mexican sensitivi
ties toward dem ocratic values and
hum an rights. U nder NAFTA, Mex
ico is now m ore than ever part of
the “global village.”

Democratization in Mexico
As you know, Mexico has long been
dom inated by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), the po
litical organization that em erged
after the Mexican revolution. Over
the years the PRI has provided Mex
ico with considerable stability and
presided over a rem arkable trans
form ation o f the country. It is also
acknowledged by most observers
that the prom inence of the PRI has
historically discouraged the devel
opm ent of an open and com peti
tive dem ocratic process.
Just as we are witnessing a re
m arkable transform ation in Mex
ico, from a statist and protectionist
economy toward an open economy
that encourages free markets, we
are also witnessing dram atic trans
form ations in the Mexican political
system. U nder the leadership of
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari,
Mexico has taken bold steps to
wards guaranteeing the protection
o f fundam ental hum an rights and
perm itting an open and fair dem o
cratic process. For the first time in
Mexico’s history, opposition parties
have gained governorships in sev
eral states and significantly im
proved their representation in the
legislature. Electoral reform s in
1990 and 1993, including the Fed
eral Electoral Processes and Institu
tions Code, introduced reform s in
voter registration, placed limits on
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Commentary

campaign spending, and created
an electoral court to adjudicate
electoral disputes.
These reforms, however, failed
to fully satisfy opposition parties
concerned about the impartiality
o f the electoral authorities. During
the 1994 elections in the state of
Yucatan, opposition parties com 
plained o f extensive fraud. It is for
that reason th at we welcomed the
ann o u n cem en t on January 27 that
all o f the candidates for the presi
dency in Mexico had reached an
agreem ent entitled “Peace, Democ
racy and Justice.” It recognized that
a necessary and unavoidable condi
tion to a ju st and lasting peace is
the advancem ent of democracy
through free elections. In the
agreem ent the parties pledged
to work for:
■ the impartiality of electoral au
thorities;
■ p erm an en t access to voter lists
and registration data;
■ equality in access to and coverage
by the media;

■ the prevention of the use o f pub
lic funds and program s to favor
particular parties or candidates;
• the revision of the rules for party
financing;
■ the review of the points in the
penal code that could restrict
political rights;
■ the consideration of a special
federal prosecutor for electionrelated crimes;
■ a consensus to work together for
dem ocracy and convocation, if
w arranted, o f a special session of
the congress to consider further
reforms.
T he US believes this accord, prop
erly im plem ented, will strengthen
dem ocratic practices precisely at a
time when Mexico is moving to es
tablish closer ties with the US and
o ther dem ocratic nations o f the
hem isphere.
It is a tribute to the strength of
the Mexican political process that
these watershed agreem ents have
em erged less than a m onth after
the incidents in Chiapas. Chiapas,
-- -------------------------------- X
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rather than representing a reversal
in the process o f econom ic and po
litical transform ation in Mexico,
has proven to be an energizing
factor contributing to a deepening
o f the reform process. We hope
and expect that this process will
continue. T he US has been sup
portive o f dem ocratic opening in
Mexico. We have discussed fre
quently with Mexican officials our
willingness to cooperate in ways
that are in full conform ity with
Mexican law. T he US State D epart
m ent has also m et with N G O ’s to
discuss how they m ight be able to
assist Mexican N G O ’s in ensuring
the full im plem entation o f elec
toral laws.
In closing I would like to reiter
ate that we view with great opti
mism the developm ent o f closer
ties with Mexico and applaud the
process o f econom ic reform and
political opening that is taking
place in that country. The US looks
forward to deepening ties with Mex
ico and working fully with whom
ever the Mexican people elect as
their leaders in the upcom ing presi
dential race. We are confident that
NAFTA’s im plem entation will con
tinue to improve relations between
our countries in the years ahead.
In the afterm ath o f Chiapas, we are
also m indful o f the fact th at Mex
ico, as well as o ther countries in the
hem isphere, need to pay m ore at
tention to the plight of those sectors
of the population that have been
left behind by the swift changes of
m odern life.
Just as President Clinton has em 
phasized the need to address many
of the basic and fundam ental social
problem s that we continue to face
in the US, we welcome the renewed
com m itm ent of Mexico toward ad
dressing the problem s o f poverty
and inequality. A policy o f peace,
reconciliation, and dem ocratic
reform , with respect for hum an
rights, will help strengthen the ties
of our people on both sides o f the
border. O ur own principles call for
nothing less in the conduct o f one
o f our most im portant bilateral
relationships. ■
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Commentary

The Past Six Years: A Review and Revisit
by Anthony P. Maingot

t was six years ago that I wrote
my first com m entary for Hemi
sphere. As I write my last one
as editor of the magazine, it
makes sense to revisit the main
issues o f th at 1988 editorial
and take stock.
Six years ago the emphasis was
on the changing patterns o f trade
and the challenges these presented
to the Caribbean region. Specifi
cally I asked a question that was
n eith er particularly original nor
new: w hether the small Caribbean
nation-state, characterized by deep
ly held concepts o f sovereignty and
the individualism typical o f insular
societies, was the best institutional
base from which to confront the
challenges so clearly on the hori
zon. T he question is still valid be
cause it is still unanswered. And yet,
six years later it no longer seems
like the most urgent issue.
T he m ost pressing issue today is
w hether, even as quite individualis
tic societies, enough regional sense
exists to understand that given the
n atu re of their problem s, Carib
bean nations have to cooperate
with each other. It is, after all, in
this age o f dom estic and interna
tional restructuring, relatively easy
to score some good hits on Carib
bean leaders for no t acting with
greater unity and m ore forcefully.
In this regard, however, it is im por
tan t to note th at no t all the tenden
cies have been discouraging; both

I

Anthony P. Maingot, founding editor
(^H em isphere, steps down from this
post effective with the publication of this
issue. His successor is political scientist
Eduardo A. Gamarra, who is acting
director of the Latin American and
Caribbean Center at Florida Interna
tional University.
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the positive and the negative trends
have to be analyzed so as not to fall
into the general gloominess and
pessimism that today appears to
predom inate am ong Caribbeanists.

I Inflexible concepts of

sovereignty have to
make way for collective,
intraregional and
international links that
can assist in confronting
the calamity that
threatens to overwhelm
democratic structures
everywhere.
O n the negative side, one has to
reiterate that despite the never-end
ing agreem ents to form unions of
one sort or the other— the latest
being the Association o f Caribbean
States—actual behavior shows the
persistence o f centrifugal rather
than centripetal forces. Not even
the generalized threats to the Car
ibbean’s traditional exports and,
perhaps even m ore immediately,
to those nontraditional industries
that the Caribbean Basin Initiative
engendered and prom oted seem
to support effective collective ac
tion. If the N orth Am erican Free
T rade A greem ent (NAFTA) m en
aces the region’s garm ent and as
sembly industries, then Jam aica and
Trinidad and Tobago— leaders of
CARICOM—decide to apply for en
try into NAFTA on their own. The
Dom inican Republic, rebuffed by
CARICOM, pursues the same route.

Positive Trends
Before we dwell totally on such
lam entable individualism, however,
it is good to analyze some o f the
positive trends in C aribbean col
laboration. These tend to be in the
political and m ore symbolic arenas.
This was the case of the political ob
servers and workers sent in 1987
and 1990 by islands such as St.
Lucia and Dom inica to help the
Haitian peo p le’s efforts at estab
lishing democracy. Having partici
pated extensively in both attem pts
myself, I m arvelled at the effective
ness with which hundreds o f Creole
speaking West Indians operated in
this once forbidden land. The hope,
lit bright by those experiences and
now dim m ed by tyranny, should
n o t be allowed to die out.
A nother trend that honors the
incipient spirit o f pan-Caribbean
collaboration is CARICOM’s op en 
ing towards Cuba. Just like Willie
B randt’s Oostpolitik, so condem ned
by President Ronald Reagan, op en 
ing doors and establishing bridges
are vital to an eventual dem ocratiza
tion of Cuba ju st as they had been
in the East G erm an case. T he West
Indian aggiomamento towards Cuba
has had to face the hostility o f two
American adm inistrations and di
rect threats from im portant m em 
bers of the US Congress. And yet,
seldom in the past has there been
such a solid front on a Caribbean
issue. In virtually every Caribbean
state, labor unions, the private sec
tor, and governm ent have signaled
their com m on will to trade and ne
gotiate with Cuba and to keep the
lines of com m unication open. Even
conservative governm ents, such as
that of Eugenia Charles in Domi
nica for instance, understand what
only the US adm inistration refuses

to adm it publicly: that the Cold
War is over n o t only for the likes
of C hina and Vietnam but also for
Cuba, and th at the best way to fa
cilitate a peaceful transition to de
mocracy is through contacts and
interaction, n o t isolation.
W hat em erges from an analysis
o f these positive trends is the role
o f democracy, the m ost im portant
“symbolic capital” that m ost of
these small states enjoy. It is as de
mocracies that they participated in
Haiti, answered the threats from
the US Congress, and invariably
m eet the conditions on respect for
hum an rights now com m only set
by m ultilateral lending agencies. It
is this dem ocracy that, sustained by
educated and mobilized popula
tions, is the best guarantee that the
small states will m anage to ride out
the very rough econom ic times
ahead.
All o f which leads me to believe
th at the threats to these dem ocra
cies will n o t com e mainly from the
reorientation o f trade and invest
m ent flows. They will com e rather

from the internationalization of
corruption and the crime and vio
lence that invariably accom pany it.
T he dam age this can do to small so
cieties is already palpably evident.

Drugs and Venality
In island after island, the effects of
drug usage and the venality that
comes with the drug trade are
threatening the very sinews o f the
society. In Puerto Rico the Na
tional G uard is deployed to fight
what has to be called a war o f the
narcotraffickers against the society.
Trinidad is caught in the grips of
an unprecedented crime wave and
revelations o f high-level collusion
with Latin Am erican Mafiosi shake
the society all too frequently. Cura
sao, according to the Dutch press,
has becom e the center o f a Colombian-European-US drug syndicate,
while urban Jam aica is divided into
political enclaves best called “garri
son constituencies.”
T here are, o f course, islands
where there is little com m on crime
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and violence but m uch corruption.
Dutch St. M aarten, for instance, is
littered with fancy private jets carry
ing mysterious passengers to enig
matic destinations. The p oint is
that there is hardly a society in the
Caribbean that has escaped the rav
ages that local greed and the insa
tiable N orth Am erican dem and for
drugs have wrought.
And so, as im portant as the
problem s of trade and investm ent
are, the fundam ental task facing
Caribbean elites is to strengthen
the dem ocratic state by m aking it
m ore accountable and transparent.
Inflexible concepts o f sovereignty
have to make way for collective,
intraregional and international
links and cooperative arrange
m ents that can assist in confront
ing the calamity that threatens to
overwhelm dem ocratic structures
everywhere. Caribbean unity and
collaboration is needed n o t ju st to
negotiate its econom ic destiny but
also to safeguard those dem ocratic
institutions that make the world re
spect the reg io n ’s voice at all. ■
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Cuba’s New Capitalists
by David Adams

t ’s 8 p.m., pouring rain, and
the M iram ar district of West
Havana is w ithout electricity
again. T he streets are deserted,
a few candles blink from apart
m ent windows, and Cubans
settle down for an o th er long, dreary
night. Down one potholed street,
however, things are hum m ing—
literally. T hrough the rain can be
heard the rum ble o f a generator,
a rare sound indeed in a Cuba
starved of all consum er items, in
cluding fuel supplies. More than
ju st the background score for a
good time, it’s the sound o f C uba’s
clandestine economy.
Com m unism may grind to a halt
when the power is out, but C uba’s
new capitalists d o n ’t stop for any
thing. In July 1993 Fidel Castro
legalized the use of the US dollar
after 30 years o f “anti-gringo” rhet
oric. Millions of those dollars are
now pouring into the island from
Cuban exiles in Miami anxious to
assist needy relatives. T he roar of
th at dollar flood lets C uba’s new
capitalists know they have a lot of
catching up to do.
G uided by four young Cubans, I
ru n towards a brightly illum inated
porch, dodging the rain u n d er sag
ging tree branches. T here is laugh
ter and music inside. “Oye, Pedro!
O pen up, we’re h ere,” shouts one
o f my com panions, knocking on
the d o o r with his fist. T he door
opens and a smiling Pedro emerges.
“Welcome. You’re late,” he says.
“W ho’s he?” he asks, looking suspi
ciously at me. “H e’s the journalist
we told you ab out,” answers Ramon,
one o f the young m en with me.

I

David Adams is a Latin America corre
spondent f err the Times (London).
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“Look,” Pedro says with a m enacing
grin, ‘just be careful no t to write
anything about me. I ’ll be screwed,
and you will be, too.”

The “liberation ”
of the dollar is
undermining the
egalitarian principles
of the revolution,
opening the door to
corruption and
creating a new class
of Cubans who live,
work, and eat outside
the reach of the
socialist state.

Pedro is a “maceta,” C uban slang
for the mafia of black m arketeers
who are em erging ever m ore openly
from the shadows o f a dying revolu
tion that is already beginning to
live a savage postcom m unist brand
o f capitalism. T he “liberation” of
the dollar is underm ining the egali
tarian principles o f the revolution,
opening the door to corruption
and creating a new class o f Cubans
who live, work, and eat outside the
reach o f the socialist state.
In 1990 Castro announced a
“special period for times o f peace”:
an austerity plan on a wartime scale
intended to help Cuba survive the
breakup o f the Soviet bloc and the
loss o f foreign subsidies and oil

supplies. D uring this special pe
riod, econom ic conditions in Cuba
have grown steadily worse. Televi
sion program s are now teaching
Cubans how to make their own
candles, how to bake fruit rinds as
m eat substitutes, how to make their
own toothpaste and deodorant,
and how to grow m edicinal herbs.
Meanwhile, those with access to
dollars can shop at well-stocked—
but expensive— superm arkets
known as “diplo-stores.” Cubans
call it “diplo-com m unism .”

A Secret Restaurant
In the air-conditioned com fort of
the dining room in his cram ped
hom e, Pedro has started a secret
restaurant— Chez Pedro. T here is on
ly one table (reservations accepted)
so he can claim that his custom ers
are guests if the police arrive. Pedro
is no t his real nam e and he d oesn’t
like the word “maceta” either. The
term literally m eans “h am m er,” re
flecting the m afia’s reputation as
hardened criminals with economic
power. “I prefer trafficker," he says.
His aim in life: “I want to live like
Michael Jackson and work like
Pablo Escobar.”
In a country where m ost people
travel by bicycle, Pedro has five cars,
although they are all beat-up Soviet
Ladas. “Hey, a Lada is like a lim ou
sine in C uba,” he says. Petrol may be
hard to com e by, but n o t for Pedro.
He has gallons o f the stuff hoarded.
In Cuba all property is owned by
the state, and moving house con
sists of a swap where no money
changes hands. But Pedro owns
several houses, including one in the
luxury beach resort o f Varadero.
Pedro began his life o f crime
some years ago. But since the dol
lar ban was lifted, he says life has

I
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never been better. Now it’s easier
for him to conceal the source of
his money. As he expands his busi
ness operations, he estimates his
earnings have ju m p ed about $1520,000, m aking him the equivalent
o f a C uban m illionaire in pesos,
and possibly one o f the richest m en
in the country. O n the black m ar
ket a dollar is worth 70 pesos today.
While Pedro can make m ore than
one m illion pesos a m onth, state
salaries vary from only 148 pesos to
600 pesos p er m onth. “Pedro is the
king o f the macetas,” one of my
friends tells me.
Most Cubans these days are
forced to live on the rice and beans
th at they receive in m onthly rations
at subsidized state prices. Few Cu
bans have eaten m eat or fish in
m onths, even years. At Chez Pedro
the m enu consists of lobster tail,
m arlin, shrim p, and pizza. My
friends are lucky; they have rela
tives in Miami who send them dol
lars. O ur meal, for five people, cost
$82, or the equivalent o f two years
salary in a regular state job.
Eating in P ed ro ’s dining room is
like traveling back in time. An imi
tation Tiffany lamp sheds an uneven
light over a dining table com plete
with china plates and engraved
wine glasses in silver vessels. T he ta
ble is ad orned with silver pheasants
and assorted art-deco knickknacks.
Marble and bronze statues— one
about six feet tall by a French sculp
tress—dom inate two corners o f the
small room . A forged Rene Portocarrero hangs on the wall in a
splendidly elaborate gold-painted
wooden frame. Everything is for
sale: the forged painting for $5,000;
the genuine statue for $8,000.
“Anything to drink gentlem en?”
A waiter dressed in a tall, white
c h e f s h at and long white apron

T

has entered. A bottle o f sparkling
Spanish wine is selected while my
fellow diners opt for a Detroit
“Piels” beer, smuggled past the
30-year-old US trade em bargo
against Cuba.

There was a time
when Cubansfeared
the authority of the
state, and taking
liberties with the
communist system
was deemed too risky.
N ot today.

“I swear to you that th ere’s no th 
ing you can request that I cannot
supply,” boasts Pedro, who has
jo in ed us at the table. “I have my
contacts. D on’t ask me w here,” he
adds. My friends explain that Pedro
has bought “access” at every tourist
hotel and restaurant in Havana.
Anything he needs can be stolen at
the drop of a hat. Bribery and con
tacts are what count in the last days
of com m unism. I d o n ’t look con
vinced, so Pedro leaves the room
and comes back with a small 1929
Gil Garcia painting—genuine, but
stolen—a West G erm an syringe,
and a dozen tiny bottles o f m or
phine. “Satisfied? You want cocaine,
m arijuana, ju st let me know. OK?”
Sitting next to me, Jose, a sur
geon from the Calixto Garcia hospi

tal, is shocked. “Do you know how
hard it is for me to get m orphine?”
he says and launches into a de
tailed description o f the shortages
at one o f C uba’s top medical insti
tutions. Public health, one of the
m ost vaunted achievem ents o f the
Cuban revolution, is having to cut
all sorts of corners to make do. The
laundry room cannot cope due to
the power cuts, so patients must
bring their own sheets. Doctors are
allowed one bar of soap p er m onth
to wash their hands. Jose is due to
attend a medical conference abroad
next m onth. H e plans to defect and
fly to Miami.

Self-Employment Pays
Efigenio would like to leave, too,
bu t he knows his chances are slim.
So he is m aking the best o f a new
opportunity offered by the revolu
tion to go into private business. In
Septem ber 1993 the governm ent
decreed that nonprofessionals
could apply for licenses to becom e
self-employed in simple trades. Efi
genio is a highly qualified u n d er
water engineer and diver, but he
was laid off from his regular jo b
cleaning ship bottom s in the p ort
of Havana. C uba’s m aritim e com
m erce has fallen drastically since
the breakdown of trade relations
with form er com m unist allies in
eastern Europe.
H e still receives 40% o f his
m onthly salary, which am ounts to
about $3, to support his wife and
two children. But since Septem ber,
Efigenio and a friend have been il
legally fishing and diving for lob
ster every m orning n ear where he
lives on H avana’s sea front, the
Malecon. He hasn’t applied for a
governm ent license and d o esn ’t
intend to. “They w on’t give me
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one. They want the lobsters for the
tourists,” he says, pointing out that
there is a 500-peso fine for fishing
lobsters illegally.
He may be right. At C uba’s most
exclusive “foreigners-and-dollarsonly” superm arket near the old
Soviet embassy, C uban lobster is
being sold for $23 a pound. Cuban
shops d o n ’t have it. In fact, Cuban
shops d o n ’t have any fish at all, or
meat, or fruit, or . . . the list is end
less. Efigenio sells his lobsters on
the black m arket for 80 pesos a
p ound, or $1.15. O ne night he and
his p artn er m ade 1,500 pesos fish
ing two hours each m orning, and
he expects to double that soon.
According to the Cuban govern
m ent, m ore than 19,000 people
have requested self-employment li
censes since Septem ber 1993. The
old com m unist party bureaucracy
is having trouble coping with the
stam pede for capitalism. Long
queues have developed outside
labor ministry offices, requesting
licenses for taxicab drivers, hair
dressers, and bicycle and shoe
repairpersons.

Enthusiasm for Dollars
W hen I m et Eduardo at a friend’s
house and he told me that he
planned to start his own food
stand, I decided to follow him
through the application process.
I was surprised when he said he
th o u g h t it could be done in a day.
But then I d id n ’t count on Eduar
d o ’s ingenuity and the new Cuban
enthusiasm for m aking dollars.
E duardo appeared to have one
m ajor problem : he d id n ’t have a
jo b or the necessary culinary back
ground the law required to apply
to work independently in food
and beverages.
T here was a time when Cubans
feared the authority o f the state,
and taking liberties with the com 
m unist system was deem ed too
risky. N ot today. Eduardo laughed
when I suggested that what he was
about to do m ight get him in troub
le. “No one is frightened anymore.
W e’re too busy surviving,” he said.
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I offered to help by driving him
around Havana in my rented car.
I was running low on petrol and
Eduardo said he knew where we
could fill up quickly. A few m inutes
later I watched E duardo suck petrol
from a governm ent ministry truck
with a hose, directly into the tank
o f my car, in broad daylight. So
m uch for fear.

Although the
communist party
remains firm ly in
control in Cuba, it
has become almost
irrelevant to the needs
of society as it is
increasingly less able
to provide the basic
necessities and social
services it so proudly
claims are the rights of
every citizen.

Next we visited E duardo’s friend,
who had, at least until it closed in
Septem ber o f 1993, m anaged a
large state factory. H e neatly typed
out a false reference for Eduardo
saying he had worked as the cook
at the factory for the last five years
and was a m odel o f “revolutionary
discipline.”
Earlier in the day, Eduardo had
dropped in at the ministry o f labor
to spy out the lay of the land. He
struck up a conversation with a
young woman in the office and
agreed to pay h er $5 to hurry his
paperwork through. W hen we re
turned with the reference, I waited
in the car while E duardo entered

the ministry. H e was back trium 
phantly in less than 10 m inutes with
the approval in his hand.
There are thousands of Eduardo’s
doing precisely the same thing all
over Havana, some legally, others
not. T here’s Jose, the electronic
genius who makes his own satellite
dish TV receivers out of oil cans so
he can watch CNN. He steals the
signal from a large tourist hotel and
charges $70 to install the hom em ade
equipment. And there’s Juan, who
washes the tourists’ cars outside the
Riviera Hotel. He was chatting with a
police officer when I thanked him
for cleaning my car. We joked that a
few weeks ago the officer would have
arrested Juan for accepting the $1
bill I paid him. N ow juan is making
m ore in one day than the police of
ficer is paid in two months. “I’m
getting rid of this,” says the police
officer about his uniform. “I want to
go to the countryside and raise
pigs,” he adds.

Irrelevant Party
The com m unist party, reeling from
one econom ic crisis to another, is
in no position to tell the people
what to do. Although the party re
mains firmly in control in Cuba, it
has becom e alm ost irrelevant to
the needs o f society as it is increas
ingly less able to provide the basic
necessities and social services it so
proudly claims are the rights of
every citizen. “They know they
can’t feed us. At least they let us
feed ourselves,” says Eduardo.
T he fate o f the revolution hangs
in the balance and the direction of
recent reform s rem ains unclear as
it plots a course through unchar
tered waters. Meanwhile, in Miami,
C uban exiles are waiting for what
they believe is an inevitable popu
lar uprising against Castro.
But back at P ed ro ’s restaurant,
the talk is no t o f counterrevolution.
“I hope Fidel never falls,” says Pedro.
“Everything I have, all this,” he says,
spreading his arms, “I owe it all to
Fidel. I’m grateful to Fidel. Do you
think I could survive if the Miami
exiles take over this country?” ■
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Cardenas, PRI, and the US Vote
by Sallie Hughes

n April 1993 C uauhtem oc Car
denas rallied striking Mexican
m ushroom pickers in Pennsyl
vania. In August, in Tijuana, he
m et with Mexican-Americans
setdng up a US election cam
paign com m ittee. T he then u n 
official presidential candidate for
M exico’s Partido Revolucionario
D em ocratico (PRD) was on the
stum p again in the US. But unlike
1988, when he barnstorm ed the US
claiming electoral fraud after his
failed presidential bid, C ardenas
will face com petition for the sup
p o rt o f the 5-7 million Mexicans
who live in the US.
A m ore aggressive and better
organized Partido Revolucionario
Institucional (PRI) has jo in ed the
battle for the hearts and m inds—as
well as m oney and votes—of Mexi
cans living n o rth o f the border.
“We are working hard to present
o u r version o f things,” said M artin
Torres, PRI subdirector o f interna
tional affairs.
From as far away as Pennsylvania
and as near as San Diego, 30 groups
representing hundreds o f Mexican
farm workers and environm ental
and hum an rights organizations in
the US m et with Cardenas in Au
gust 1993 in Tijuana. Officially they
pushed for fair elections. Unoffi
cially they came out to support
C ardenas, who still represents the
strongest challenge to continued
PRI control of the Mexican presi
dency. “We have a lot o f interest in
m aintaining and reinforcing our
ties with the Mexican com m unity in
the U nited States,” Cardenas said.

I

Sallie Hughes is a political reporterfor
El Financiero International, an
English-language weekly based in
Mexico City.
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C ardenas first toured the US in
1985 as the PRI governor o f the
central Mexican state o f Michoacan,
addressing cheering m igrant work
ers in W ashington state’s Yakima
Valley. Since then he has traveled
to Texas, California, New Mexico,
Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Illinois,
and New York. To the chagrin of
the Salinas de Gortari adm inistra
tion, C ardenas has talked during
his m ore recent trips about elec
toral fraud in Mexico and his own
version o f a free trade agreem ent.

PRI has worked
vigorously to bring
Mexican workers
in the US back into
its fold.

According to Rodolfo Elizondo,
the secretary for international rela
tions o f the conservative opposition
Partido Accion Nacional (PAN), the
PAN has taken its cue from the PRD
and stepped up its efforts in the
US, as well. T he first PAN newslet
ter, Accion Intemacional, was mailed
to Mexican leaders in the US in
August 1993. PAN president Carlos
Castillo attended conferences at
seven US border-state universities
and m et with Mexican leaders in
each community. Interim PAN
governor Carlos M edina o f G uana
ju ato also visited the US in the fall
o f 1993.
But the biggest response to the
Cardenas challenge comes from
President Salinas and the PRI. Sali

nas has worked vigorously to bring
Mexican workers in the US back
into the PRI fold. Since Salinas
took office am id protests on both
sides o f the border, the govern
m ent has visibly prom oted educa
tional, cultural, and hum an rights
program s for Mexicans in the US,
consular employees in San Diego
said. The six people on the hum an
rights staff o f the San Diego consu
late, for example, filed 3,735 peti
tions on behalf o f 966 people in
March 1993. In 1987 the staff of
two oversaw an average o f about 80
petitions a m onth.
As another indicator of increased
governm ent activity, Mexico has
opened, with governm ent logistical
support, 14 new cultural institutes
in the US since 1991. Only the insti
tute in San A ntonio existed before
Salinas took office.
Salinas has also extended his
popular Solidaridad poverty alle
viation program to the US. Some
analysts credit Solidaridad at hom e
with rebuilding popular support
for the PRI between 1988 and the
congressional elections of 1991. U n
der the nam e o f Solidaridad Inter
national, the basics o f the program
have been extended north.
In addition, in the past three
years, the PRI has form ed 16 new
political com m ittees in the US, and
four m ore are n ear com pletion.
Only a Los Angeles club officially
existed in 1988, the PRI’s Torres
said. Besides keeping a high com
m unity profile, the “C om patriot
Support C om m ittees” distribute
practical inform ation, such as the
rights o f aliens in the US and how
a Mexican national can bring a car
purchased in the US back into
Mexico.
Since 1853, when form er presi
d en t Benito Juarez plotted his re

turn to Mexico after being exiled
to New Orleans, the Mexican op
position has occasionally sought re
lief n o rth of the Rio Grande. The
governm ent’s aggressive stance
represents a new twist, one that
acknowledges the im portance of
transnational political strategies in
an era when the bo rder exists as a
boundary but n o t as a barrier.

The Role of the US Vote
T he political support of Mexicans
and Mexican-Americans in the US
is im portant to candidates vying for
Mexico’s presidency. If they voted
as a bloc, the millions o f Mexicans
in the US could sway an election.
For the m om ent, however, form ing
such a bloc is alm ost impossible be
cause the great majority o f im mi
grants would have to return to
their hom e com m unities in order
to vote. B order state polling places
only accept a small num ber o f vot
ers registered in o th er areas, ac
cording to Torres. T he PRD pushed
to allow expatriates to vote in Mexi
can consulates as part o f a political
reform package debated in the
Mexican congress, but the pro
posal never got a full hearing and
died. In the past, it also has pushed
for absentee balloting. The PRI re
fused in both cases, citing the com 
plexity o f guaranteeing a fraud-free
election.
Mexican law prohibits an in
fusion o f cam paign m oney from
workers in the US. Even still, ana
lysts p o in t o u t that im m igrant
cam paign m oney is a form idable
attraction for Mexican political
parties. Although political parties
deny it, some observers think both
the opposition and the PRI re
ceived US campaign m oney in
1988. Denise Dresser, o f the Insti
tu te Tecnologico A utonom o de
Mexico, claims that PRI and PRD
com m ittees in Los Angeles raised
m oney in 1988. “It is n o t clear how
m uch, but everybody knows that
they d id ,” she said.
Even a little m oney could help
the PRD, whose cam paign chest is
bare when com pared with that of

the wealthy PRI, said Ju an Molinar,
a professor at the Colegio de Mexi
co. People at the Cardenas m eet
ing in Tijuana spoke o f raising
$1 million, a gesture Cardenas
publicly refused.

Party strategists
are emphasizing
transborder efforts
became they believe
Mexican immigrants
in the US are opinion
leaders who can sway
the vote of their
compatriots at home.

An additional draw is the access
im m igrant groups have to the US
media. In 1988 C ardenas and pro
testing PRD sympathizers suc
ceeded in widely publicizing their
claims of electoral fraud. Some of
the biggest anti-PRI dem onstra
tions at the time were in front of
Mexico’s consulate in Los Angeles.
T he new C ardenas group vowed to
lobby the US Congress and Presi
dent Bill Clinton on electoral and
hum an rights issues. A represen
tative of Jesse Jackson’s Rainbow
Coalition agreed to add his g ro u p ’s
voice.

Campaigning in San Diego
Meanwhile, Salinas hopes the myr
iad pro-governm ent efforts will
prom ote a positive image o f the
governm ent, the com ing presi
dential elections, and the N orth
American Free T rade A greem ent
(NAFTA). Convincing San Diego
residents o f the m erits o f free trade
is part o f the reason why the Mexi

can consulate there is keeping a
higher profile, said Mexican consul
Gustavo Iruegas. “It is easy to find
people in San Diego who are not
even familiar with T ijuana,” he
added. T he Mexican governm ent
spent about $32 m illion to prom ote
NAFTA in the US in 1992, the com
m erce secretariat announ ced in
Septem ber 1993.
Finally, party strategists are
em phasizing transborder efforts
because they believe Mexican im
m igrants in the US are opinion
leaders who can sway the vote of
their com patriots at hom e. Mexi
cans living in the US m aintain ex
tremely strong ties to their hom e
com m unities, especially in the
southern states where C ardenas’s
support is thought to be strong.
Many return annually for saint’s
day festivals and to provide finan
cial support for relatives.
Leaders at C ardenas’s planning
m eeting said getting Mexicans in
the US to convince their com patri
ots at hom e to vote is a top priority.
“We are telling people, ‘If you can
no t return hom e to vote, then be
sure to call hom e and tell your
friends and relatives,”’ said Raciel
Garcia, a farm worker organizer
who works n ear Palm Springs, Cali
fornia. Econom ist Carol Zabin, who
researches Mexican im m igrants for
both the University o f California at
Los Angeles and Tulane University,
believes the PRD has a lot o f work
to do. “I d o n ’t perceive a big or
ganizational effort. They n eed to
get to villages on saint’s days and
sign up the immigrants, o r some
thing like th at.”
Despite its new efforts, the PRI
is no t assured o f a US political fol
lowing, either. Many Mexicans are
in the US precisely because the
econom ic policies o f PRI adm inis
trations h u rt them . O ne o f those
anti-PRI im m igrants is Belen Rosas,
who attended the Cardenas m eet
ing on behalf o f his organization
of Oaxacan workers in California.
“T he vote here would represent a
vote against the system,” he said.
“We are here because the govern
m ent ignores o u r com m unities.” ■
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Drugs Alter the Security Agenda
by Ivelaw L. Griffith

ataclysmic changes in in
ternational politics and
in the dom estic politics
o f many countries around
the globe since the late
1980s have ushered in a
new era in world politics— the postCold War era. Scholars and states
m en are, as yet, unable to fully
explain the close o f the Cold War
chapter in world history or to grasp
all that the end o f the era portends,
b u t m ost o f them accept that one
discernibly changed area is the
security arena.
High-agenda security items like
nuclear holocaust, the global arms
race, and the Strategic Defense Ini
tiative are being displaced by what
Jam es Rosenau, a respected inter
national relations scholar, calls
“in terd ep en d ence issues” (e.g.,
environm ental concerns, AIDS,
chronic debt, and international
drug trafficking). These issues span
national boundaries and cannot be
addressed at the local or national
level. O f course, the challenges of
the post-Cold War period do not
present uniform threats to nations,
states, o r regions. N either, as a mat
ter o f fact, did the challenges o f the
Cold War era.
The post-Cold War security
agenda is n o t only changing in
content, but also in conception.
T he nature o f threats to nations
and states in the contem porary
world necessitate redefining the
term “security” itself. It is becom-

Ivelaw L. Griffith is professor of politi
cal science at Florida International Uni
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Security in the Caribbean (Praeger,
1991) and author of T he Q uest for
Security in the Caribbean (M. E.
Sharpe, 1993).
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ing increasingly obvious that n o n 
military developm ents can and do
pose genuine threats to nations
and states; that in many regions the
basis o f threats is no longer exter
nal, bu t internal; and, thus, that
traditional ways of viewing counter
measures often no longer hold.

The geonarcotics
arena: where conflict
and cooperation
among national and
international actors
are driven by drugs.

As m ight be expected, scholars
differ in their views and interpreta
tions of the evolving post-Cold War
political landscape and o f the chal
lenges that are likely to face nations
in the era ahead. Stanley Hoffm an
of Harvard University, for example,
anticipates the developm ent of dif
ferent currencies o f power affixed
to different poles of international
power: military^ econom ic and fi
nancial? dem ographic, etc. Edward
Luttwak o f the C enter for Strategic
and International Studies in Wash
ington envisages a new world order
whose central feature will be geo
economics— the adm ixture o f the
logic of conflict with the m ethods
of com m erce. Samuel H untington
of Harvard University’s Institute
for Strategic Studies, on the other
hand, challenges contentions that

economics will be the fundam ental
source o f world conflict. He sees
culture as the key source o f dis
cord, asserting that “the clash of
civilizations will dom inate global
politics. T he fault lines between
civilizations will be the battle lines
of the fu tu re” (Foreign Affairs, Sum
m er 1993).
N one of these propositions are
necessarily mutually exclusive, but
one can sense that the post-Cold
War international com m unity will
be devoting considerable time, ef
fort, and resources to an in terde
pendence agenda item that falls
outside the param eters o f the
propositions m entioned above.
T hat agenda item is narcotics. In
deed, the president o f the 1993-94
session o f the UN G eneral Assem
bly, Amb. Rudy Insanally o f Guy
ana, rem arked prophetically in
O ctober 1993 that “the interna
tional com m unity’s success in con
trolling drug abuse will serve as a
litmus test of its ability to respond
to the com plex problem s of the
post-Cold War era.”

The Role of Geography
O ne can already discern the devel
opm ent o f what I call “geonarco
tics”: significant relations of conflict
and cooperation am ong national
and international actors that are
driven by drugs. Geography is a fac
tor in this geonarcotics arena, not
only because o f the global special
dim ensions o f drug operations, but
also because the geographical fea
tures o f areas facilitate certain drug
operations. For example, the physi
cal geography o f South America
and C entral and South Asia en
hance the prospects and potential
for cocaine and heroin production,
respectively. And the Bahamian

archipelago and o th er topographi
cal features of Latin America and
the Caribbean, and o f Central,
West, and Southeast Asia, facilitate
drug trafficking. Power in the geo
narcotics milieu is both state and
nonstate in origin, with nonstate
power brokers sometimes exercis
ing m ore sway than some state
agents. Consequently, in this mi
lieu, politics, which involves re
source allocation—determ ining
who gets what, how, and when— is
no t only a function o f state action.
T he Caribbean is no t exem pt
from having to pay increasing at
tention to conflict and cooperation
driven by drugs. T he reg io n ’s m ajor
security concerns in the latter part
of the Cold War era were foreign
intervention, instability, and milita
rization, with vulnerability as an allencom passing dilem ma. Now, in
the early post-Cold War period, in
stability and vulnerability rem ain,
but the m ost critical problem s re
late to drugs. Not that drug prob
lems are a creation o f the new era;
they were there before, bu t their
scope and intensity, and the dim i
nution in im portance o f some
o th er concerns, have pushed drugs
to the top o f the security agenda.
Contrary to the belief held by
some people, there is no single
“drug problem ” in the Caribbean.
N either is there a single drug in
volved. T he problem s relate to
drug production, abuse, traffick
ing, and m oney laundering. And
the “danger drugs” are m arijuana
(popularly called ganja), cocaine,
and heroin. N either cocaine nor
heroin is produced in the region,
but these drugs— especially cocaine
and its derivative, crack—present
the m ajor abuse headaches. T here
is trafficking in all three drugs, with,
as should be expected, variation in
trafficking sites, volumes, and kind
o f drugs. In regard to money laun
dering, some countries are known
or suspected; others are not. In any
case, gone are the days w hen drugs
in the C aribbean were merely a
problem in Jam aica, the Bahamas,
or Belize. Now all countries—His
panic and non-Hispanic—are part

o f the action, in different ways, with
different consequences.
Guyana, for example, unknown
for m ajor drug operations a decade
ago, is now both a m ajor ganja p ro
ducer and cocaine transshipm ent
location. In M arch 1993, for in
stance, 117 pounds o f cocaine were
found aboard a Guyana Airways
C orporation (GAC) plane in New
York following its arrival from Guy
ana. US Customs fined GAC $1.8
million for this violation. Even m ore
dramatic, in Ju n e 1993, police in
Guyana confiscated 800 pounds of
cocaine, US$24,000, hundreds of
thousands o f Colom bian pesos,
and thousands o f Guyana dollars
following an aborted transship
m ent operation. Several Colom
bians, Guyanese, and Venezuelans
were im plicated in the affair. And
in early April 1994, a police raid at
Karabese, along the Atlantic coast,
resulted in the destruction o f 14
acres o f ganja. T he situation is so
grave that President Cheddi Jagan
has called for consideration o f le
galization as a counterm easure.

Drug-related crime
has transformed the
“paradise” character
of many Caribbean
vacation spots, driving
fear into locals and
foreigners alike, and
depressing tourist
activity.
These drug operations have
security implications in that they
threaten the physical and psycho
logical safety o f citizens and the
governability o f states in the re
gion. T here are several political,
military, and econom ic conse
quences, including corruption,
arms trafficking, vigilantism, de

pressed tourism, and increased
crime. Close observers o f the Car
ibbean have known for some time
what the New York Times reported
on April 19, 1994: that drug-related
crime has transform ed the “para
dise” character of the US Virgin
Islands and o th er Caribbean vaca
tion spots, driving fear into locals
and foreigners alike, and depress
ing tourist activity. Moreover, gov
ernm ents in the region are forced
to com m it already scarce resources
to the “war on drugs.” Thus, drugs
present a real security dilem m a for
the Caribbean. T he scope and in
tensity of the threat vary from coun
try to country, but to paraphrase
Martin Carter, the distinguished
Caribbean poet, the situation is
such that “all are involved; all are
consum ed.”

Many Fronts
Given the m ultidim ensional nature
o f the problem s, no single counter
m easure will suffice. Battles have to
be waged simultaneously on several
fronts: law enforcem ent, educa
tion, interdiction, legislation, and
rehabilitation, am ong others. All
these require resources of various
kinds. T he problem is, though,
that Caribbean countries have se
vere resource deficiencies, n o t only
in term s o f money, but also in terms
o f personnel, skills, and technology.
Domestic initiatives alone can
not deal with the drug ph enom e
non. Regional and international
action is necessary because the drug
phenom enon is a transnational
one—an interdependence issue.
Governm ents alone cannot do what
is required. Individual citizens and
nonprofit organizations, in the Car
ibbean and elsewhere, will n eed to
contribute. Many already do. The
casualties in the counternarcotics
battles will be hum an as well as in
stitutional. T he battles will be long
and hard. Yet, Caribbean govern
m ents and people have to rem ain
engaged. W hether we like it o r not,
drugs will be part o f the Caribbean
security agenda for m uch o f the
foreseeable future. ■
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Teaching Classical Music in Haiti
by Robert M. Grenier

n July of 1993 I was invited to
give vocal instruction at the
Ecole Ste. Trinite, a private
teaching institution supported
by the Anglican C hurch in
Haiti. I was one o f a handful
o f volunteer music teachers from
C anada and the US who instructed
these students in an entire range of
musical instrum ents—and in my
case, voice—during the school’s
three-week sum m er camp.
T he course o f study included
class instruction in music theory
and history, individual lessons on
each stu d en t’s instrum ent, and
participation in a variety of ensem 
bles. These ensembles consisted of
the four separate wind and string
groups divided into ju n io r and
senior categories respectively, a
m e n ’s and boy’s chorus called Les
Petits C hanteurs, and the full sym
phony orchestra L’O rchestre Philharm onique Sainte Trinite. These
six ensem bles m et daily employing
an entire student body ranging in
age from seven and eight-year-olds
to m ature adults.
Ecole Ste. Trinite may be con
sidered one o f the glories of the
island for, in contrast to the physi
cal decay that all too apparently
plagues Port-au-Prince, it harbors
one o f the country’s great spiritual
treasures: its talented youth. Every
day these prom ising young people,
along with their instructors, would
follow a prescribed routine that
appeared like some serene and
confident gesture arising from the

I
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tum ult and misery surrounding the
walled precinct o f the school.
Each m orning at 9 a.m., u n d er
the stern gaze of their m entors, 100
o r so well-groomed, young Haitians
assembled in the school’s courtyard
to attend the cerem ony o f drapeau
(flag raising). After the flag raising,
there followed the official litany of
prayers, scripture reading, hymns,
and announcem ents. With obliga
tions to both God and Caesar duly
rendered, the business o f making
music took its param ount position
in the im agination of all.
T he orderly ranks broke only to
be refashioned again in classrooms
devoted to the study of theory, to
participation in an ensem ble, or to
the business o f practicing o n e ’s in
strum ent. The latter was done every
where—in studios, classrooms, and
rooftops. Much had to be learned
in a short time, for at the end of
the three-week program would
com e two lengthy public concerts
and num erous solo perform ances
at six student recitals.
Situated in the heart of Port-auPrince and adjacent to the Angli
can C athedral o f Ste. Trinite, the
Ecole Ste. Trinite consists o f a se
ries o f interlocking structures that
are quite evidently the result o f sev
eral building campaigns. Judging
by the lack of accord am ong their
designs and by the choice o f build
ing materials and even floor levels,
each building seems to have been
designed by a different architect.
Yet this seeming inharm onious jig
saw arrangem ent has housed a vast
num ber o f souls seeking a most
com pelling harm ony. T he crown
ing glory o f this tangled architec
tural assemblage is the Salle Ste.
Cecile, a m odern, air-conditioned
concert hall situated on the top
floor of the m ost recent structure.

It possesses a good acoustics and
can seat several hu n d red on its
steeply banked terraces. The hall is
decorated with a variety o f paint
ings by Haitian artists, and the
school itself adorned with beauti
fully sculpted doors and many
large murals painted by one o f its
form er students, the sonorously
nam ed Voltaire Romulus.

Unique and Beautiful
W ithin the guarded com pound
that is the school o f Ste. Trinite, a
unique and beautiful world unfolds
where teaching, self-discovery, the
encounter with great music, fellow
ship, and individual growth occur
between regular periods allotted
for work and play. Twice daily, at
10:30 a.m. and 3 p.m., a bell rings
to announce gouter. a half-hour pe
riod where refreshm ents are served
to all. T he earlier o f these two peri
ods is the most m em orable, for it is
then that the younger m em bers of
Les Petits C hanteurs, fresh from
their m orning encoun ter with the
seraphic music o f M ozart’s Solemn
Vespers, break their ordered ranks
to descend upon the food and
drink like some vision of fallen
angels from Paradise Lost. Their
frantic gam boling on the concrete
pavem ent ends only upon the ring
ing o f the second bell w hen they
proceed to modify their hellish ululations into songs inspiring enough
to sustain the faithful. Such energy
and high spirits are com m on at
Ste. Trinite, where the many stu
dent recitals are well-attended and
encores are frequent. To make
good music is im portant to every
one there, bu t it is also very im por
tant to have fun.
In the opinion o f many, the city
outside Ste. Trinite is in its worst

state in m ore than a decade. The
various em bargoes im posed on
Haiti, as well as its own volatile po
litical culture, have left Port-auPrince in an appalling condition:
buildings and streets are crum bling
with garbage left in piles every
where and frequently set alight.
T he oppressive heat o f the tropical
sun accelerates the spreading of
the stench o f garbage and hum an
waste. The great swarms of people
walking about appear purposeful
and in ten t only upon surviving an
o th er day. The few cars and trucks
are evidence o f the effectiveness of
the fuel em bargo. In fact, this em 
bargo is directly responsible for the
camp being held in Port-au-Prince
rath er than at Leogon, many miles
to the southeast where it is nor
mally conducted.
An electrical g enerator failed
during d in n er one evening, leaving
only a back-up that itself stopped in
term ittently, plunging the capital
into darkness and w ithout the
power to pum p water. By 10 p.m.
there was no light to be seen in the
capital except at those points, such
as Ste. Trinite, that were connected
to the power line that serves the
presidential palace. It was startling
one evening to see the stars in such
clear abundance as if we were stand
ing in a country field far away rath
er than in the center o f a m odern
national capital. Despite these ad
versities, the pride o f the ordinary
Haitian rem ains strongly in evi
dence. O ne m an associated with
the school was reproached by a
Haitian woman who crossed the
street to forbid his photographing
a queue o f trucks waiting for gas.
She insisted th at he should not re
cord their misery.

A World of Contrasts
T he contrast between the world
outside and inside the walls of Ste.
Trinite was m irrored in m iniature
during the teaching o f private voice
lessons. Most often, perched on a
third story balcony with a com m and
ing view o f the m ountains fram ing
Port-au-Prince, the individual tenors

and basses of Les Petits Chanteurs
would com e to have their vocal
technique and artistry scrutinized.
Am ong Les Petits C hanteurs was a
very young and exceptional student
with the musical nam e o f Remi. His
voice was beautiful, but how m uch
m ore so it appeared since poor
Remi had ju st been released from
the hospital where for nearly two
weeks he had been fighting ty
phoid fever caused by contam i
nated water.

H a iti’s turbulent
political situation
threatens a cornerstone
of civil life.

The exceptionally harsh circum 
stances surrounding the lives of the
sum m er cam p participants do not
appear to prevent the program
from functioning like nearly all
camps and sum m er music schools.
T he two public concerts in July,
each three hours in length, stand
as m onum ents to the activity o f the
school and the determ ination o f its
par-ticipants. Both concerts were
perform ed in Salle Ste. Cecile to a
full house and were recorded by
Haitian television for later broadcast.
The program s for each consisted
o f some three to five occasionally
m ultim ovem ent works by each of
the six ensembles. Most of the selec
tions were taken from the W estern
classical tradition such as the per
form ance o f B eethoven’s Sym
phony No. 8 by L’O rchestre
Philharm onique Sainte Trinite.
T he o th er selections were tailored
to the technical and artistic level of
the ensem ble in question. But par
ticularly striking was the uniquely
Haitian classical music by the com
posers Ferere Laguere and Lodovic
Lam oth that appeared on both pro
grams. T he second concert was dis
tinguished by a hom age to Ferere
Laguere (1935-85), featuring three

o f his works: two orchestral, Un sel
badjo, mi-an mi-an and Conte Haitian,
and a song entitled “M usique” that
reflects that aspect o f French musi
cal sensibility that is at once pas
sionate yet restrained, com bined
with a sensuousness derived from
the uniquely Haitian rhythms.
T he intensity of the sum m er’s
activities quickly came to an end fol
lowing the second concert. The in
evitable long good-byes, exchanges
o f gifts, and promises to retu rn next
year were indulged as is customary
and natural following such intense
daily contact. A year in Haiti how
ever, can be very long—a m uch
harsher and m ore unpredictable
proposition than a year experi
enced in N orth America. Indeed,
w henever discussion turn ed to pol
itics and the anticipated retu rn of
Jean-B ertrand Aristide, a sense of
submission to the inflexibility of
events seem ed the most com m on
response o f the young students.
H aiti’s turbulent political situation
has often threatened the school’s
musical activities. T he threat to the
school can materially affect the
progress o f the students, who in
the past have received many full
scholarships from US universities.
Apart from this, that threat seems
to im peril the symbol o f what civil
society could be like in Haiti.
The solemn m orning cerem ony
of drapeau, where fealty to God and
country are expressed in song and
word, is the formal release o f a vig
orous fountain of talent and en e r
gy whose torrents daily filled every
vessel set before it. T he six hours of
music prepared for the public con
certs represent the students’ tre
m endous discipline and individual
devotion to their instrum ents and
to one another; a requirem ent to
m aster the dem ands, both intricate
and subtle, m ade by the music of
Beethoven, Mozart, and Laguere.
T he ability to work hard and to
share generously seem to be the
cornerstone o f civil life. T he ex
tinction o f this brilliant example
would be potentially m ore harm ful
to Haiti than the loss o f its one re
m aining generator. ■

H em isp h ere • W inter/Spring 1994

illi

■

in

ill!

Insider briefs on people and institutions
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs

Don’t Call the SS Harlan County
W om en have becom e the newest
targets o f political violence in Haiti.
According to a jo in t UN-OAS ob
server mission, there has been a new
surge of sexual assaults against fe
m ale supporters o f Jean-B ertrand
Aristide, H aiti’s democratically
elected president, who is now in
exile in W ashington. W om en’s
groups report as many as “18 cases
o f rape in a single day,” and many
o f the “victims are m arket women
who live in poor, pro-Aristide neigh
borh o o d s” ( The Miami Herald, April
13, 1994).

When the Dust Settles
According to a Newsday (May 12,
1994) analysis o f Panam a’s May
presidential election, candidate
R uben Blades expects to be back in
1999. Even though the US-based ac
tor received only 17% o f the popu
lar vote, the leader o f the Papa
Egoro M ovem ent scared many op
position party old-timers with his
late spurt in popularity. T he coun
try’s new president—Ernesto Perez
Balladares—captured 33% of the
ballots. According to Blades, “W hen
the dust settled, we were the third
political force in the country.” The
party also m anaged to capture nine
seats in Panam a’s unicam eral legis
lative assembly.
T he big question, however, is
what happens to the actor now that
he has lost the race? Many of his
supporters say, “W e’ll win it in ’99,”
the year o f the next election, but
according to Newsday, Blades w on’t
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commit. The best he can offer is to
stay in Panam a awhile so as “no t to
give the im pression that I’m skip
ping town.” Besides, one report
states he has lost as much as $150,000
a m onth in revenue during the nine
m onths o f intense campaigning.

A New OAS? A New Location?

Brazil is now taking steps to reduce
the cost o f prophylactics, which re
portedly “are am ong the m ost ex
pensive in the w orld” (Journal of
Commerce, April 22, 1994). T he costreduction m easures are tied to a
new list o f duty cuts the govern
m ent announced in April as part of
a Ministry of Industry, Trade, and
Tourism effort to slash inflation.
Currently priced at about $1 each,
the cost o f condom s will likely drop
to about 47 cents each once the
duty and o ther im port taxes are
elim inated.

W hen Joao Baena Soares steps
down as secretary general o f the
OAS, his successor—Colombian
president Cesar Gaviria—will con
front challenges ranging from the
lingering difficulties with Haiti to
the thorny question o f C uba’s pos
sible re-entry into the organization.
Perhaps the m ost difficult, though,
will be presented to him by com 
munity leaders in Miami, who will
lobby heavily to relocate the OAS
secretariat to Dade County.
A key elem ent in this lobbying
effort will be a successful gathering
o f Latin Am erican heads o f state
during the Summ it o f the Americas,
D ecem ber 9-10, 1994, in Miami. Is
this pie-in-the-sky? Not necessarily.
Just m onths before President Bill
Clinton decided to hold the sum m it
in Miami, the city was n o t even on
the list o f possibilities, and then was
aggressively opposed by senior State
D epartm ent officials, am ong others,
largely because o f their concern
over ethnic and exile politics there.

Check It Out

Arizona’s NAFTA Niche

For those who are interested in a
well-written and inexpensive news
and public affairs m agazine from
Mexico, Excelsior’s Mexico Insight
may be just the ticket. This bi-weekly,
full-color, English-language pub
lication is edited by Michael J.
Zamba. In its May 1, 1994, issue,
Mexico Insight offered thoughtful
articles on the challenge before
Ernesto Zedillo, the new presiden
tial candidate of the Partido Revolu
cionario Institutional, on the heels
of the assassination of his prede
cessor, Luis Donaldo Colosio.

The Arizona State Legislature ap
proved a $100,000 grant in April
1994 to create a com puter network
designed to position the state as a
regional inform ation hub for busi
ness trading u n d er the auspices of
the N orth American Free Trade
Agreem ent. Although details are
n o t yet com plete, the grant will
underw rite an initial feasibility
study and start-up costs for the
network. Carol Colombo, o f the
Phoenix-based law firm o f Colom
bo & Bonacci, is one o f the privatesector advisers to the project.

One Less Excuse

I

Radio Marti Redux/Seeming
(and Being) Useless
T he US Inform ation Agency’s Of
fice o f Cuba Broadcasting took
m easures in M arch 1994 to send
the message that it too could be
downsized “w ithout any negative
im pact on broadcast quality radio
and television program s to the
people of C uba.” Four employees
in the Research Analytical U nit of
Radio M arti’s Office o f Research
were targeted. In their own defense,
the ousted employees argued that
“time and again, in perform ing
their responsibilities, the analysts
have sought to bring to the Radio
Marti d irecto r’s attention real,
underlying problem s in news and
program m ing, only to have the
director respond by marginalizing
the analytical unit, by progressively
elim inating o u r functions and by
attem pting to ultimately make us
seem totally useless.”

When Wasn’t It?
In response to escalating violence
directed at nationals and foreigners
in Guatemala, one G uatem alan private-sector leader has observed,
“It’s like the Wild West out in the
streets” (Business Latin America,
April 25, 1994). T here have been
few periods in the country’s con
tem porary history, however, when
violence h asn ’t been excessive and
directed simultaneously at both rich
and poor, the political and the apo
litical, and national and foreign
groups. W hat does make this epoch
distinctive is the growing influence
o f a “powder elite” that is linked to
narcotics trafficking.
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With Friends like These . . .
In the spring o f 1994 the Bolivian
congress accused form er president
Jaim e Paz Zam ora of developing a
very close friendship with Isaac
“O so” Chavarria, who, according to
the US Drug E nforcem ent Agency,
is the country’s principal narcotics
trafficker. In his defense, Paz Za
m ora accused the US o f conspiring
against him for inviting Fidel Cas
tro to the August 1993 inauguration
cerem ony o f President Gonzalo
Sanchez de Lozada. T he accusa
tions against Paz Zam ora and his
party, the Movimiento de Izquierda
Revolucionaria, have triggered Bo
livia’s most serious political crisis
of the 1990s, and have almost cer
tainly derailed his re-election bid
for 1997.

be based in M ontreal, will m onitor
environm ental practices o f the
m em ber countries and review com 
plaints o f unfair com petition be
cause o f stricter environm ental
laws in N orth America.
NAFTA’s trilateral N orth Ameri
can Trade Secretariat (NATS) will
be based in Mexico City. It will be
responsible for producing, archiv
ing, and translating NAFTA docu
ments. Negotiators do no t agree,
however, on NATS staffing. W here
as the US has proposed the secre
tariat be staffed by governm ent
agency officials on loan to the or
ganization, Mexico has proposed
that “outside personnel” be con
tracted and paid with funds that
are budgeted by the m em ber gov
ernm ents for the NATS.

On the Move
Implementing NAFTA
President Bill C linton’s February
1994 announcem ent that the Labor
Secretariat o f NAFTA would be lo
cated in Dallas pleased many but
no t all Texans. Some were dis
turbed that the secretariat would
be located at the Dallas C ham ber
of Com m erce, which, after all, has
had little or no interest in the labor
agenda. T he secretariat, to be fully
operational by July 1994, will have
a $3 million budget. It will enforce
the workers’ rights side agreem ent
to NAFTA.
In addition, Clinton will place
the NAFTA D evelopm ent Bank in
San Antonio. T he bank will u n d er
write NAFTA-related com m erce,
environm ental, and infrastructure
projects, with funding eventually
reaching $3 billion. NAFTA’s Envi
ronm ental Commission, which will

Georgette Magassy Dorn has been
nam ed as chief of the Hispanic Di
vision of the Library of Congress. A
specialist in Hispanic culture and
the curator of the Archive o f His
panic Literature on Tape in the His
panic Division, she holds a Ph.D. in
history from Georgetown University.
Mark B. Rosenberg, founding di
rector of the Latin Am erican and
Caribbean C enter (LACC) at Flori
da International University (FIU)—
who has served in that capacity for
17 years— has taken a leave of ab
sence to assume the interim deanship o f FIU ’s newly proposed
College o f U rban and Public Af
fairs. Eduardo A. Gamarra, a politi
cal scientist at FIU, is now acting
director o f LACC. He will also serve
as editor of Hemisphere beginning
with the next issue.
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A Sociologist Turns to Politics
by Mauricio A. Font

B razil’s current crisis involves a diverse array of highly charged forces: economic,
social, environmental, and—above all— political. If elected president, would
academician Fernando Henrique Cardoso stand a chance of being effective?
“. . . [A]n ethic of ultimate
ends and an ethic of re
sponsibility are not abso
lute contrasts but rather
supplements, which only in
unison [define] who can
have the callingfor poli
tics. . . . Only he has the
callingfo r politics who is
sure that he shall not crum
ble when the world from his
point of view is too stupid
or too base fo r what he
wants to offer. ”
— Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation ”

“As a politician, your re
sponsibility is to change
reality and notju st defend
principles. If you ’re com
mitted to change, you can
not turn an ethical position
into an obstacle to action. ”
— Fernando Henrique Cardoso, The
New York Times, March 14, 1988

H em isp h ere. W inter/Sprin g 1994

ith the May 1993
appointm ent of
F ernando H enrique
C ardoso as finance
m inister, Brazilian
politics took a truly
ironic twist. C ardoso’s criticisms of
the 1964 authoritarian regim e cost
him his jo b as a professor o f soci
ology as well as four years in exile.
After a brilliant academ ic career
that included founding depend
ency theory, this m ajor critic o f Bra
zil’s “associated d ep e n d en t” m odel
was now given the task of solving its
worst econom ic crisis since the turn
o f the century. If Cardoso succeeds,
the country may well avert chaos
and Cardoso could becom e the
next president in 1994. High as
the personal costs o f failure may
be, they pale in com parison to the
highly polarized and potentially ex
plosive presidential election that
could result if the crisis persists or
deteriorates further.

W

The Challenge
The increase in oil prices in 1973
and 1976 and the debt crisis that
followed in 1982 battered the Bra
zilian economy. Gross national

Mauricio A. Font is associate professor
of sociology at Queens College and
Graduate School, City University of
New York. His main work on Brazil is
Coffee, C ontention, and Change
(Blackwell, 1990).

product p er capita decreased 5%
during the 1980s. Meanwhile, infla
tion continued its steady climb to
m ore than 30% p er m onth in early
1993, signifying an annual inflation
rate o f 2,500%. In the two years pre
ceding C ardoso’s appointm ent as
finance minister, five predecessors
(one o f whom lasted less than three
m onths) and six stabilization pro
grams failed to bring inflation u n 
der control. Cardoso’s im m ediate
task was to slay, or at least slow
down, Brazil’s galloping inflation
by early 1994. Beyond that, he has
to initiate or at least prepare the
ground for some form of structural
adjustm ent.

The Making of a Hero
W hat makes Cardoso a prince of
hope in such a context o f gloom?
Why did the best known critic of
the Brazilian developm ent model
undertake the mission o f saving it?
A lifetime o f intellectual, adm inis
trative, and political achievements
explains the strength o f C ardoso’s
appeal as a hero for the times. The
saga that would lead eventually to
politics began when the Brazilian
military regim e forced the rising,
left-leaning professor out o f the
Universidade de Sao Paulo and
into four years of exile in 1964.
Taking up residence in Chile,
Cardoso really “discovered” Latin
America and a richer theoretical
and comparative framework in
which to analyze Brazil. Santiago

u

was perhaps the m ost intellectually
exciting place in Latin America in
the mid-1960s, as the left criticized
structuralism in an atm osphere of
optimism about the desirability and
im m inence o f m ajor social change.
His involvement in the U N ’s Eco
nom ic Commission for Latin Amer
ica and Santiago’s universities and
research centers led to a focused
concerned on the question o f de
velopm ent, a b roader Latin Ameri
can framework, and engagem ent
in the m ain currents o f social dem 
ocratic and socialist thought. Car
doso’s collaboration with Chilean
sociologist Enzo Faletto produced
Dependencia y desarrollo en America
Latina (1969; published in 1979 as
Dependency and Development in Latin
America by the University o f Califor
nia Press), perhaps the most influ
ential interpretation o f twentiethcentury Ladn Am erican structural
dynamics. H e soon em erged as the
leading figure in Latin American
dependency theory.
Cardoso retu rn ed to Brazil in
late 1968, anticipating his reactiva
tion as a professor at the Universidade de Sao Paulo, bu t a wave of
repression in the following year
“canceled” his ten u red position.
In response to this setback, he es
tablished, along with several col
leagues, the C entro Brasileiro de
Analise e Planejam ento (CEBRAP)
in 1969. U nder C ardoso’s presi
dency, CEBRAP challenged the
stifling intellectual climate the
military h ad created in Brazil.
Cardoso and his associates went
on to play a substantial role in the
process o f gradual reopening after
1974. A task force from CEBRAP
played a key supporting role in the
M ovimento Democratico Brasileiro
(MDB)— the m ain political organi
zation dem anding the return of

i
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democracy. T he very objective of
creating a space in which alterna
tive views about Brazilian society
could be entertained made CEBRAP
and its president protagonists in
that struggle, and m arked CEBRAP
for a terrorist attack. It was this strug
gle that would eventually bring
o u t in full C ardoso’s vocation as
a politician.
Cardoso spent the 1970s m aking
sense o f Brazilian authoritarianism
and exploring conceptual and theo
retical issues raised by his brand of
dependency theory. T he m ost excit
ing result o f these explorations was
his bold analysis o f the relationship
between local social classes and the
state and the limits of the nation
alist developm ent strategies based
on im port-substituting industriali
zation—as well as his developm ent
o f a conceptual framework to ex

plain the political and econom ic
dynamics o f all o f Latin America.
R ather than calling for a reduc
tionist approach to the politics of
developm ent, his deeper concern
is with understanding em ergent
social classes, political processes,
and states through historically
grounded research.
In 1978 Cardoso ran for the
Brazilian senate. His victory as an
alternate led, in 1979, to the vice
presidency o f the Partido do MDB—
the political party that grew o u t of
the MDB during Brazil’s dem ocra
tization process. Cardoso becam e
one o f Sao Paulo’s regular senators
in 1983, following A ndre Franco
M ontoro’s election as state gov
ernor. Max W eber’s classic essay,
“Politics as a Vocation” (quoted on
page 20), provided the inspiration
for his inaugural speech.
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C ardoso’s defeat in the 1985 Sao
Paulo mayoral race showed how
m uch the neophyte had yet to learn
in o rd er to m aster politics— even if
the loss was partly due to internal
squabbles within the PMDB. He
learned the lesson and in the race
for the senate in 1986, he proved
to be one o f the biggest vote-getters.
As the New York Times (March 14,
1988) p u t it, he was “no longer
drawn to the cloistered life o f aca
dem ia,” b u t had “learned to play
politics am ong politicians.”
Politics becam e progressively
more absorbing for Cardoso through
out the 1980s. Along with many in
tellectuals and o th er professionals,
he founded in 1988 the Partido
Social Dem ocratico Brasileiro
(PSDB). It was a m ore cohesive,
principled, and m anageable party
than the PMDB, but its small size
raised doubts about its prospects.
Despite this, the founders forged
ahead in articulating a progressive
platform based on what to them
was a realistic b u t socially responsi
ble assessment o f the country’s pre
dicam ent, including an approach
to econom ic policy that sought to
balance state action with expanded
roles for the market. In a political
system th at traditionally has been
oriented to patronage and has
ten d ed to polarization, such a call
to m oderation and responsibility
could only hope to gain ground
gradually, b u t the party’s reputa
tion as a serious political organiza
tion grew quite rapidly. C ardoso’s
ap pointm ent as m inister o f foreign
relations in 1992 and finance minis
ter in 1993 reflected increased rec
ognition o f both him and the PSDB.

The Action: Content and Context
If stabilization and adjustm ent are
unavoidable, Brazil is due for even
m ore fundam ental reforms. With
the demise o f state-led import-sub
stituting industrialization, it needs
to find a new developm ent strategy
and redefine the state’s econom ic
role. In im m ediate practical terms,
the governm ent m ust choose a
com bination o f m easures from a

H em isp h ere• W inter/Spring 1994

list of such difficult instrum ents as
fiscal reform , privatization, trade
liberalization, deregulation, and
similar “o rthodox” advice—a far
cry from the “hetero d o x ” policy
normally associated with the neo
structuralism and dependency
analysis o f the 1970s.

Cardoso is one of the
few national political
figures able to work
effectively with most
contenders in the
Brazilian polity as
well as with foreign
investors and
governments.

Critics see poetic justice in the
unconventional Cardoso being
com pelled to follow fairly conven
tional econom ic advice. But Car
doso is no stranger to incongruities.
To sympathizers, his keen dialecti
cal m ind will synthesize dem ands
and program s into a forward-look
ing perspective for the new century.
C ardoso’s m ain asset in this situ
ation is his reputation as honest
leader, able negotiator, and effec
tive politician. He has already shown
that he is one of the few national
political figures able to work effec
tively with m ost contenders in the
Brazilian polity as well as with for
eign investors and governm ents. As
an impressive conciliator and tacti
cian in the senate and the 1988
constitutional assembly, he devel
oped constructive relationships
with entrepreneurs and trade u n 
ions, political parties, and the mili
tary. T he respect he com m ands in

the international arena feeds the
perception o f a statesman able to
claim for Brazil a m ore salient
global role.
In the m eantim e, it would be
foolish to expect Cardoso and his
allies, or any o th er actor, to suc
cessfully im plem ent all o r most of
the required reform s within a year.
Successful structural adjustm ent or
even plain stabilization normally
takes years to carry out. In light of
this reality, what has been achieved
so far and what results can realisti
cally be expected in the near future?
The initial m easures im ple
m ented after Ju n e 1993 focused
on public sector reform s aim ed at
reducing the large and growing
governm ent deficit o f approxi
mately $22 billion (of an $89 bil
lion budget). Fiscal reform s in 1993
included a budget cut o f $6 billion,
tough m easures against tax evasion
(a phenom enon that costs Brazil
$25-30 billion p er year), and call
ing in overdue debts owed by the
states to the central governm ent. As
a result, tax collection in 1993 was
up by m ore than 25% with respect
to the previous year and was grow
ing at record levels in early 1994.
These policies have brought in
creasing m acroeconom ic stability—
even if their full im pact will take
years. T he projected budget for
1994 will have a significant surplus.
Still, the econom ic team was frus
trated that inflation increased from
30% to 40% p er m onth as of Jan u 
ary 1994. C ardoso’s fight against
the deficit—the m ain cause o f in
flation— scored an o th er m ajor vic
tory in late February, when the
congress approved a special $16
billion fund, financed through in
creased taxes, that theoretically en
sures fiscal equilibrium for at least
two years.
T he fiscal m easures prepared
the ground for a stabilization p ro
gram proper—FHC2 (as dubbed
by the m edia)—also approved in
late February 1994. T he m ain stabi
lization instrum ent in FHC2 is a
new index to be used in adjusting
salaries and eventually m ost prices.
T he U nidade Real de Valor (URV)

replaces 11 different indices cur
rently in use. Pegged to the dollar,
the URV is conceived as a pream 
ble to the adoption of a strong cur
rency— the third step in Cardoso’s
plan. With reserves nearing $33 bil
lion (up from $23 billion with Fer
n an d o Collor de Mello) and a solid
trade surplus, the governm ent is in
a very good posidon indeed to in
troduce a stable currency.
The new fiscal context creates
favorable conditions for speeding
up the privatization process. Even a
partial sale o f the state’s 159 public
enterprises worth $193 billion will
bring considerable additional re
sources to the treasury. T he state
has already privatized significant
holdings in the steel industry. While
progress in o th er sectors has been
relatively m odest as of early 1994,
three dozen firms are being readied
for the auction block this year, in
cluding m uch o f Em braer, Brazil’s
aerospace giant. These transactions
should bring in several billion dol
lars. In addition, constitutional revi
sions are being planned to further
reduce governm ent spending, in
crease taxes, and allow for m ore
privatization.
T he reform s adopted or in prog
ress lay the groundw ork for further
advances in the econom ic restruc
turing agenda, b u t the bulk of
these m ust be addressed by the
governm ent com ing to office in
January 1995. The governm ent is
selectively using tariff reduction as
a disciplinary tool against sectors
th at increase prices faster than the
URV. But m ajor new rounds in
trade liberalization are unlikely in
1994. While somewhat higher than
Latin Am erica’s average o f 11 %,
the 14.2% m ean tariffs represent a
considerable d ro p from previous
levels and are unlikely to experi
ence m ajor cuts anytime soon. As
a result, im ports increased by 25%
in 1993— to a total of $26 billion.
Inflation will indeed need to de
crease substantially in the near
future for the reform s to be per
ceived as successful, but a m ore
durable solution is within reach of
the next Brazilian government.

Cardoso talks to factory workers in Sao Paulo during his 1978 campaign for the Brazilian senate.

Cardoso addresses a special commission o f the Brazilian senate in 1994.

Cardoso’s plan picked up m om en
tum when long negotiations with
the International M onetary Fund
(IMF) and o ther foreign lenders fi
nally led to a resolution o f the debt
problem in April 1994. T he effec
tive approval o f Brazil’s stabiliza
tion plan has pu t into m otion an
agreem ent to repay $49 billion of
the foreign debt u n d er the term s
o f the Brady plan— that is, using

US Treasury D epartm ent bonds as
collateral—and to renegotiate the
entire debt o f $123 billion. Again,
the m acroeconom ic environm ent
created by Cardoso’s econom ic
team gets m uch o f the credit for
solving this huge problem , and
thus putting an en d to the inter
national debt crisis of 1982.
While the fiscal picture is greatly
improving, the best grounds for op
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timism come from the perform ance
o f the Brazilian economy itself. At
$446 billion, this top Latin Ameri
can economy is larger than Russia’s.
It grew by a healthy 5% in 1995
and is expected to come close to
that rate in 1994— while last year’s
productivity grew by 6%. Having
already withstood m ajor forms of
adjustm ent, the private sector
rem ained remarkably resilient
through often ill-conceived meas
ures o f past governm ents and re
sponded well to the new econom ic
reforms. T he export sector has
been particularly impressive and is
responsible for a 1995 trade sur
plus o f $15 billion in the context of
sharply increased imports. Simulta
neously, foreign investm ent has
grown substantially—from a nega
tive $400 m illion in 1989 to a posi
tive $400 in 1990, $1.1 billion in
1991, $2.9 billion in 1992, and an
estim ated $5.5 billion in 1995. A
m ore stable m acroeconom ic envi
ro n m en t should lead to the same
or higher levels of perform ance.
T here is growing agreem ent in
Brazil that the root o f the country’s
crisis has m ore to do with politics
than the economy. The main ob
stacles to reform come from weak
nesses in the evolving political
system. Dem ocratization has proven
h ard er than first thought. President
Itam ar F ranco’s limited political
base compels him to dole out pol
icy concessions to win support. The
fragm entation of the party system
makes consensus extrem ely diffi
cult and provides incentives for
many o f these parties to block
reform for narrow political and
econom ic reasons. Since policy
successes enhance the chances for
C ardoso’s presidential bid, other
presidential hopefuls have some
thing to gain by blocking them in
the congress.
T he adoption of FHC2 by the
Franco-Cardoso governm ent has
put Brazil on a sound track, but the
policy and political situation re
m ains perilous. Parts o f the plan
were initiated with tem porary exec
utive decrees that still require con
gressional approval. A most hopeful
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sign is that the very long and open
process of negotiation that Car
doso used to arrive at his stabiliza
tion plan has generated a broad
and stabilizing alliance, even if the
tem ptation to defect rem ains high.

There is growing
agreement in Brazil
that the root of the
country’s crisis has
more to do with
politics than the
economy.

Failure to reduce inflation and
stop the crisis would most benefit
Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva, the Par
tido dos Trabalhadores candidate
who has led in the polls for m onths.
It is clear that, whatever happens,
what the governm ent does between
now and O ctober 1994 will greatly
shape the results o f the election.
A nother big question is how m uch
tolerance the military will have for
a leftist candidate com m itted to a
larger role for the state, particularly
if there is a weakening in governability as the elections approach.
Last year there were clear rum 
blings o f military anxiety over cor
ruption and incoherence in the
congress and the prospects o f a
deepening political crisis. Since a
candidate of the right seems objec
tionable to many Brazilians, the
very danger in the situation may in
the end favor a center-left m oder
ate candidate such as Cardoso.

The Journey Ahead
Predicting Brazilian politics is a
risky business, but it is difficult to
foresee dem ocratization in Brazil
without the PSDB and Cardoso as
m ajor players. If the current re
forms and policy team organized

by Cardoso survive through 1994, it
will likely lead to an enhanced po
litical role for both regardless of
the outcom e of the O ctober elec
tions. T he PSDB and Cardoso will
thus em erge as significant winners
from this situation—even if a dra
matic turnaround in the rate of
inflation does not materialize. On
the o ther hand, a m ajor deteriora
tion of econom ic or political con
ditions, coupled with any large
miscalculation by o th er players,
could still bring the country close
to chaos. The passage between the
Charybdis of ineffectiveness and
the Scylla o f turbulence is in fact
populated by hungry sharks, but
this situation only focuses m ore
sharply the attention on the skills
and nerve of the one at the helm,
enhancing the dram atic quality of
the perform ance.
Will the stars that have guided
Cardoso this far continue to shine?
Probably, though clouds on the po
litical horizon will make them hard
to see at times. If so, Cardoso’s stint
as finance m inister will indeed have
opened a new and m ajor chapter
in the drawn out process o f Brazil
ian dem ocratization and economic
reform . T he expectation that this
is the last chapter should be tem 
pered by signs that the book is far
from com plete. The difficulty in
obtaining short-term success pales
in com parison to the larger eco
nom ic and political challenges
ahead—stabilization, structural
adjustm ent, and the form ation of
a durable coalition around a new
developm ent strategy. A good per
form ance against inflation and in
political stabilization will earn Car
doso and his party a cardinal posi
tion from which to negotiate with
o th er contenders the adoption of
effective answers to pressing long
term problem s. But the ultim ate
answer is necessarily a collective
one. W hat will m atter in the end is
the political maturity o f institutions,
political organizations, and the gen
eral public. Therefore, what the
current situation puts to an exact
ing test is the process o f Brazilian
dem ocratization itself. ■
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Crisis and Environment
byJ. Timmons Roberts

uring the 1982 UN Envi
ro n m en t Conference,
Brazil was called “the
w orld’s worst polluter.”
Moreover, reports o f pol
lution and deforestation
in the Amazon worsened through
o u t the decade. In 1989, when a
US congressional delegation of
fered to help generate resources for
the environm ental protection of
the Amazon, President Jose Sarney
responded, “We d o n ’t want the
Amazon to becom e a green Persian
Gulf.” By 1992, however, Brazil was
playing host to the massive UN Con
ference on Environm ent and Devel
opm ent, and Sarney’s successor,
Fernando Collor de Mello, signed
all the proposed conventions. Some
o f these— on climate change and
biodiversity, and the declaration of
principles on forests—could poten
tially limit Brazil’s econom ic growth
rate. Thus, the event appeared to
signal an im portant reversal o f pol
icy for a country that had long re
jected outside pressures to protect
its environm ent.
Satellite photographs of the
Amazon reveal that the current
rate of deforestation is down dra
matically from th at of the 1980s. Es
timates o f how m uch deforestation
occurred during the 1980s are still
contested, from NASA’s 15,000
square kilometers per year to the
W orld Resources Institute’s 80,000.
T he latest NASA figures, however,
are down sharply from either fig
ure: satellite photographs from 1991

D

J. Timmons Roberts is assistant profes
sor of sociology and Latin American
studies at Tulane University. He is the
author of “Squatters and Amazon Ur
ban Growth, ’’T he Geographical
Review (October 1992).
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show the rate at around 10,900
square kilometers. T he figures for
1989 and 1990 were also lower than
for previous years. T he dim inished
rate o f deforestation, which began
in 1988, has led observers to ques
tion w hether the drop is truly the
result o f successful environm ental
policies and enforcem ent, or m ere
ly a product o f wet burning seasons
and the country’s devastating eco
nom ic crisis.

To head off
international avarice,
B razil’s military
pushed fo r rapid
occupation by
Brazilians of what it
saw as “empty spaces. ”
Yet the projects
boomeranged.

Has Brazil truly tu rn ed environ
mentalist? Why did Brazil’s state
leadership feel it had to undertake
a long and expensive international
political campaign to “g reen ” the
country’s image? Are Brazil’s eco
nom ic and political crises condu
cive to environm ental protection?
Which m ajor players support or
oppose protectionist measures? Is
a national consensus on environ
m ental policy in the making?

The Problems
Brazil suffers from a series o f dire
environm ental problem s. For ex
ample, the species-diverse Atlantic
Coast forest—which in colonial
times stretched virtually unbroken
from the country’s northeast to its
south— is now reported to be m ore
than 90% decim ated, with its rem 
nants still threatened. M ore than
70% of Brazilians have no sewage
treatm ent (a situation underscored
by Brazil’s recent cholera epidemic),
a problem reaching from far rural
isolation into the h eart of Brazil’s
most m odern cities: industrialized
Sao Paulo, with a population of
m ore than 15 m illion residents and
accounting for alm ost a q u arter of
Brazil’s entire gross national p ro d 
uct, lacks sewage treatm ent for m ore
than 80% o f its population. Air pol
lution and illegal toxic dum ping are
also widespread problem s.
Most international concern,
though, has centered on the de
struction of the ea rth ’s largest and
oldest block o f tropical rain forest:
the Amazon, two-thirds o f which
lies within Brazil’s boundaries. Be
cause the Amazon region makes up
m ore than half o f Brazil’s national
territory, econom ic planners have
been encouraging its rapid devel
opm ent since the 1950s. W ith the
discovery o f impressive m ineral
resources there, Brazil’s post-1964
military regim e becam e concerned
with international avarice toward
the Amazon. To head off a feared
“invasion,” the military pushed for
rapid occupation by Brazilians of
what it saw as “empty spaces.” This
em ptiness was a m isconception,
however. For centuries the Ama
zonian economy experienced wild
booms and busts involving the ex
traction o f various com m odities

(m edicinal plants, cacao, rubber,
and Brazil n u ts), which had already
introduced a population of Brazil
n u t and ru b b er gatherers, small
farmers, lum berers, traders, and
strong local com m ercial and politi
cal elites, in addition to the indige
nous peoples already there.
To quicken the pace o f develop
m ent, Brazil’s federal governm ent
built a series o f roads into the Ama
zon, earm arked 3% o f all national
revenues for a special developm ent
agency for the region, and provided
a series o f generous incentives to
businesses setting up operations
there. Mining, lum bering, agricul
ture, and ranching—m uch o f which
was owned and operated by out
siders to the region— took off in the
1960s and 1970s. In agitating for
the developm ent o f the Amazon,
Brazil’s military had the strong sup
po rt o f some o f the n atio n ’s largest
corporations, especially those in
construction. Four o f the country’s
10 largest private firms are builders,
and were am ong the m ain benefi
ciaries o f enorm ous contracts to
build road, dam , and m ining proj
ects in the region.
Many o f these am bitious projects
were financed through external
loans, including several provided
or guaranteed by the World Bank.
Some were undertaken specifically
to provide exports that would im
prove Brazil’s debt profile with ex
ternal lenders. Yet a num ber of
these projects later boom eranged.
For example, the plan to turn the
Carajas iron deposits into an export-based, regional developm ent
project for the eastern Amazon
(funded partially by the W orld
Bank in addition to o th er external
sources) would have required 22
massive pig-iron factories fueled by
charcoal from the native rain forest.
Based on projections o f the defores
tation this was expected to cause,
international environm entalists at
tacked the Carajas project as, po
tentially, one o f the w orld’s five
worst environm ental disasters. On
the o th er side o f the Amazon re
gion, a photograph taken during
the 1987 dry season from a US

space shuttle showed m ore than
5,000 fires. T hat photo covered an
area o f the state of R ondonia where
the huge Polonoroeste colonization
project—funded by the W orld Bank
and the Inter-Am erican Develop
m ent Bank—was u n d er way.

Environmentalists
decried Brazil’s
policies, while thefa r
right claimed outside
pressure was a plot
to keep the country
underdeveloped.

European and US environm en
talists vilified Brazil for its environ
m ental and Am azonian policies,
bringing substantial pressure to
bear through agencies such as the
W orld Bank and the Inter-American
D evelopm ent Bank, the interna
tional press, the US Congress, and
the European Community. Further,
where local environm ental groups
appeared weak, the international
environm entalists worked through
or even created their own chapters
in Brazil. Contacts between interna
tional environmentalists and leaders
of Brazilian grassroots organiza
tions o f rubber tappers, Indians,
small farmers, urban environm en
talists, and others have m ultiplied
rapidly since the mid-1980s.
For a long time the military and
the far right in Brazil have claim ed
that such outside pressure was part
o f a plot to keep Brazil from becom 
ing a developed country. Speaking
to a m eeting o f the Amazon Basin’s
nine nations in 1989, for instance,
senior Brazilian diplom at Paulo Flecha de Lima described accusations
about Brazil’s poor environm ental

record as part o f “a campaign to
im pede exploitation of natural re
sources in order to block [Brazil]
from becom ing a world pow er” (O
Liberal, Belem, November 14, 1989).

New Alignments
Since the dem ocratic opening in
1985, however, Brazilian politicians
have increasingly been aware of the
environm ent’s im portance in for
eign relations. In that same year the
World Bank suspended payments
on the Polonoroeste program and
the first national m eeting of rubber
tappers was held in Brasilia. The
D ecem ber 1988 m urder o f Chico
Mendes— the internationally known
leader o f the rubber-tappers union
in the Amazon state of Acre—in
tensified pressures on Brazil to ad
dress the problem s o f deforestation
and hum an rights abuses in the
Amazon.
In 1988, President Sarney, de
spite his sometimes anti-environm entalist stance, pushed through
the country’s first com prehensive
environm ental policy, “Nossa Natureza,” which am ong o ther things
created the Instituto Brasileiro do
Meio A m biente e dos Recursos
Naturais Renovaveis (IBAMA).
T hough riddled with problem s,
IBAMA and o ther governm ent
organs have exercised growing
strength in pressing for increased
environm ental safeguards. Sarney
later cam paigned successfully for
Brazil to host the 1992 UN C onfer
ence on Environm ent and Devel
opm ent (UNCED).
Just before his inauguration in
1990, a trip by president-elect Fer
nando Collor de Mello to the US,
Europe, Russia, and Japan m ade
him acutely aware of the strategic
role of environm ental issues in for
eign affairs. After announcing a
rath er am bitious environm ental
program , Collor canceled the re
m aining fiscal incentives for land
clearing in the Amazon during his
first day in office. He also appointed
as m inister o f the environm ent the
vocal environm entalist Jose Lutzenburger (who later resigned after
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many disagreem ents) and changed
IBAMA from a regulatory to an
executive body. With the change,
the m inister o f the environm ent
advised the presidency directly,
though m uch power was vested in
the Conselho da Republica, where
a strong military presence remained.
Due to the econom ic crisis, the
potential for reducing the govern
m en t’s budget m ade cutting sub
sidies for ranching and lum bering
a relatively easy decision. Still, as
US political scientist Steven San
derson points out, “Collor d id n ’t
disconnect the environm ental im
perative from the National Security
Council.”
An undeniable feature of
UNCED—which took place as
Collor fell into a devastating cor
ruption scandal—was the massive
presence o f nongovernm ental or
ganizations (NGOs) at official and
nonofficial events. Networking be
tween environm ental, w om en’s, in
digenous, and o ther groups from
aro u n d the globe took off in Rio,
a change that appears irreversible.
W ithin Brazil, environm ental NGOs
have grown from about 40 groups
in 1980 to m ore than 2,000 in
1992. T he advocacy and research
groups—which are well connected
with universities, governm ent agen
cies, policy circles, and internation
al financial sources—are gaining
political power. According to Bra
zilian analyst E duardo J. Viola, a
class o f highly educated technicians
and adm inistrators is heading the
organizations, making the movement
increasingly m ore professional.
Environm ental groups in Brazil
vary widely in term s o f w hether
their structure is basically top-down
or grassroots in nature, the class ori
gins o f their m em bers and the par
ticular issues th at concern them ,
and their styles o f action. Most of
the country’s environm ental groups,
however, face a critical problem :
Brazil, like m ost o f Latin America,
lacks a tradition of m em bership in
civic organizations. Thus, accord
ing to Flavio de Mattos Franco of
the World Wildlife Fund in Bra
silia, Brazil’s largest group, S.O.S.
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Mata Atlantica, has only 2,000
m em bers even after a national
m em bership campaign. T he Bra
zilian chapter o f the W orld Wildlife
Fund has virtually no dues-paying
m em bers. Consequently, these and
most o ther NGOs are forced to look
for o ther sources o f funding, pri
marily from international groups,
corporate sponsors, or governm ent
contracts, thereby potentially com
prom ising their independence.

Environmentally
protected areas, which
encompass ju st 3.5%
of Brazilian territory,
are chronically
threatened by invading
gold miners, lumberers,
and squatters.

Recent interviews with several
Brazilian environm entalists reflect
their uncertainty about the direc
tion o f the ecology movement. Soci
ologist A rturo Deiges noted that in
national contests of polarizing poli
tics, groups concerned solely with
environm ental affairs have been
confronted by o th er groups push
ing for social and political justice.
While the um brella organization
for environm ental groups at the
1992 UNCED debated w hether to
exclude social justice groups from
their tent, Beth Grimberg, o f the
organization Polis in Sao Paulo,
and Mattos express the belief that
social justice and environm ental
groups are converging politically, a
process that seems to have begun in
the mid-1980s. Donald Sawyer, of
the Brasilia-based NGO Instituto de
Sociedade, Popula^ao e Natureza,
asserts that even m ainstream envi

ronm ental groups in the US now
realize the need to com bine social
justice and environm ental goals in
funding projects in Brazil.
A nother key result of the 1992
UNCED were the prom ises of
m ore than $5 billion in aid and
loans for environm ental program s
in Brazil and o th er T hird W orld na
tions. Such funding does n o t come
w ithout conditions, though, and
Brazil’s environm ental policy con
tinues to be somewhat driven by
pressure from the W orld Bank and
o ther outside lenders. For example,
some new program s require that
Brazil im plem ent the legislation
and enforcem ent necessary before
the prom ised funding is released.
Joao Paulo Capobianco, head o f the
lead environm ental group S.O.S.
Mata Atlantica, warns, “If a radical
change does no t occur in the pos
ture of the governm ent, o f politi
cians, and the press,” UNCED’s
achievements, including loans and
foreign aid, could be lost (Folha de
Sao Paulo, Ju n e 22, 1993).
According to Deiges, Brazil uses
three main policy instrum ents to
address the Amazon question: pro
tected areas, environm ental im pact
analysis, and spatial planning. Pro
tected areas, which encompass ju st
3.5% o f Brazilian territory, are
chronically threatened by invading
gold m iners, lum berers, and squat
ters. These preserves are poorly
dem arcated and will becom e m ere
islands if current trends continue:
there is growing understanding
that, rather than attem pting to
transplant the European and US
conceptions o f pristine wilderness,
a m odel o f sustainable use would
be m ore effective in the Amazon.
Yet an o th er problem is that, while
Brazil formally adopted environ
m ental im pact analysis in 1986, the
projects with the greatest potential
for environm ental destruction are
directed by the governm ent, which
exem pts itself from preparing im
pact statem ents. Finally, spatial
planning (i.e. zoning) has been
repeatedly proposed over the last
10 years, but has been notably inef
fective since Brazil lacks the infra

structure and the political will to
enforce such m easures in the face
o f desperate poverty, political pa
tronage, and corruption.

What Has Changed?
Has the tone o f environm ental de
bates changed within Brazil? Ac
cording to Jean H ebette, o f the
C entro Agrario do Tocantins in the
Amazon state o f Para, the NGOs
have been highly influential: “The
debate has changed from finding
fault to looking for solutions. Colo
nists are talking about preserving
their resources. R ubber tappers are
now talking m ore about sustainable
developm ent. T he international
ecological m ovem ent was critical in
affecting the [public’s] m entality
through the media. But their ideas
fell on good soil with the small pro
ducers.” T he old right and the
army, however, have increasingly
expressed the nationalistic view
that environm entalists are inspired
by outsiders who are threatening
Brazil’s sovereignty.
Public opinion seems to be
“green in g ” in Brazil, bu t it rem ains
unclear w hether such concern will
translate into action and w hether
it will last long now that the ex
citem ent o f the 1992 UNCED has
faded. O n the positive side, 50% of
respondents in a 1992 Gallup sur
vey in Brazil rated environm ental
issues as “very serious,” and when
asked how concerned they were
about environm ental problem s,
80% said “a great d eal” or “a fair
am o u n t.” Even m ore convincingly,
Brazil was am ong the highest of
the 24 countries studied in the
portion o f the population (71%)
agreeing that “protecting the envi
ro n m en t should be given priority,
even at the risk o f slowing down
econom ic grow th.” Brazilians,
though, ranked lowest in the world
(26%) in the rate o f “green con
sum erism ,” that is, avoiding certain
products th at harm the environ
m ent. T he same poll, designed by
US sociologist Riley E. Dunlap,
shows th at econom ic and social
issues are m ore pressing for Bra

zilians: only 2% considered envi
ronm ental problem s as the most
im portant in the nation.
US political scientist Tim othy J.
Power observes that, in spite o f the
im portance o f public opinion and
interest groups in setting environ
m ental policy, the leadership role
of the president rem ains pivotal. As
a weak president with no m andate,
Sarney’s periodic anti-environm en
tal outbursts appear to have been
largely for dom estic political con
sum ption, as he needed military
support to serve out the rem ainder
o f his term . Unlike Sarney, Collor
had 33 m illion votes, and thus had
m ore leeway to m aneuver against
the military, at least early in his
aborted term.

Public opinion seems to
be “greening” in Brazil.
It remains unclear,
though, whether such
concern will translate
into action and whether
it will endure beyond
the excitement of the
1992 UN Conference
on Environment and
Development

With the im peachm ent and
resignation o f Collor in 1992 and
the succession o f his vice president
Itam ar Franco to the presidency,
Brazil has retu rn ed to a lame duck,
unelected president with sinking
popularity and m arginal room to
set his own agenda. Faced with the
constant dem ands of what seem
like perpetual econom ic and polit
ical crises, Franco has decidedly
soft-pedaled environm ental issues.

While he form ed the Ministerio
Extraordinario para a Amazonia
and chose a form er am bassador to
the US— Rubens Ricupero— to
head it, giving Ricupero and his
new ministry a high-profile loca
tion in his old, and now vacant,
vice-presidential suite in the presi
dential palace, it rem ains unclear
what the role o f this new ministry
will be. Ricupero stepped down
from his post in March 1994 to as
sume the powerful position o f eco
nom ic m inister. He was replaced in
April by H enrique B randao Caval
canti, who prom ised to “n o t change
anything in environm ental policy.”
An indicator o f F ranco’s weak com 
m itm ent to environm ental conser
vation in the Amazon is th at he has
largely sought to avoid dealing with
the controversy raised in the afterm ath of the mid-1993 massacre of
Yanomami Indians by Brazilian
gold miners. Franco even lashed
out against officials who did not
defend Brazil’s official position on
the matter.
So, is Brazil’s econom ic and
political crisis conducive or n o t to
environm ental protection? O n the
one hand, the weakness o f the na
tional treasury makes the govern
m ent m ore attentive to the need to
create a positive image of the coun
try in the outside world. O n the
o th er hand, the ravages o f the eco
nom ic crisis continue to drive poor
people to the Amazon in search of
gold and land, making enforcem ent
o f environm ental regulations and
protecting reserve boundaries in
creasingly difficult. T he political cri
sis—which sometimes appears to
approach the collapse o f the Bra
zilian state—underm ines respect
for the rule o f law and confidence
in environm ental protection organs
such as IBAMA. Finally, in times of
desperate hardship, such agencies
seem increasingly alien and irrele
vant to the many people for whom
short-term thinking takes prece
dence over sustainable development.
The cu rren t crisis, then, has
created some factors favoring both
m ore and less attention to Brazil’s
environm ent. C ontinuing swings in
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policy and posture are likely. W hen
the president needs international
legitimacy, a large-scale project to
gain international m edia attention
is launched. Such projects are set
up “for the English to see” (as the
Brazilian saying goes), while the
root problem s go unaddressed.
T he basic problem s—poverty, cor
ruption, and violence, as well as
inequalities of land tenure and
wealth th at rank am ong the w orld’s
worst—continue to drive the poor
into the Amazon and to create an
atm osphere o f im punity for both
those who violate hum an rights and
dam age the natural environm ent.
Was Collor merely an exception,
or could Brazil’s next president, to
be elected in November 1994, sig
nificantly alter the country’s ap
proach to environm ental questions?
Leading in the polls for the presi
dential election is Luiz Inacio
“Lula” da Silva, the candidate of
the Partido dos Trabalhadores and
an ex-steelworker from Sao Paulo.
During his 1989 campaign Lula or
ganized large com m ittees of aca
demics, environm entalists, and
policy experts to develop a new en
vironm ental policy. T he structure
of power that m ight em erge from a
Lula victory would likely spell a new
level and type of participation by
environm ental and social NGOs in
setting their country’s policy. The
implications for the environm ent
of a victory by his m ain rival, Fer
nando H enrique Cardoso, are u n 
clear. We have seen how many of
the m ajor players in the environ
m ental struggle continue to face
each other: NGOs, the military,
foreign lenders, business interests,
and so on. Regardless o f the elec
tio n ’s results, changes in public
opinion and the growth of the
social justice and environm ental
NGOs are b o und to have lasting
effects on environm ental policy in
Brazil. While addressing environ
m ental issues rem ains difficult
given the ongoing econom ic and
political crises, environm ental
NGOs and international lenders
will make it impossible for Brazil’s
new president to ignore them . ■
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Central America?
If so, you will want to have a copy of the only media
directory covering Central America and Panama, the
1993 Guia de medios centroamericanos de
comunicacion. This 220-page pocket-sized book
contains details on:
• Over 300 media organizati
• More than 200 advertising
agencies and public
relations firms
• Nearly 4,000 journalists
• 17 journalism schools and
their faculties
• Goverment and embassy
press spokespersons

As well, there is useful
information, including
statistics and maps of the countries and major cities.
The price is $45 per copy, postage and handling
included.
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send m e ____ copies of the Guia de medios
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Country: _
Make your check payable to CAJP Endowment Fund
and mail along with this coupon to:
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Monetary “Lobotomy” and Inflation
by Katherine Ellison

ost Brazilians dream
o f a future in which
they could make reg
ular bank deposits,
knowing that by a
certain time they will
have saved enough for a down pay
m ent on a car or hom e. It seems a
simple fantasy for m em bers o f the
w orld’s ten th largest economy,
whose gross dom estic product grew
in 1993 by nearly 5%. Yet ever since
inflation rocketed from 45% a year
in 1976 to a record 2,567% in 1993,
the notion has grown m ore and
m ore outlandish.
This is n o t to say that Brazil’s
inflation— now at 40-plus percent
a m onth, one o f the worst rates in
the world— has n o t had some fans.
Banks, for instance, have m ade bil
lions from the price increases every
year. Speculators have also profited
from what is, in effect, a tax paid by
the poor, who have no hope o f sav
ing, to the rich. But now, the class
o f those with the savvy, surplus
cash, and sufficient lack o f scruples
to profit from the econom ic chaos
is shrinking. Meanwhile, elections
planned for O ctober 1994 are in
creasing pressure on the govern
m en t to take dram atic action.
O n March 1, then-finance minis
ter Fernando H enrique Cardoso
vowed he would m eet the challenge,
as he launched the tenth major
anti-inflation cam paign since 1980.
W ithin the same m onth, Cardoso
quit the ministry to ru n for presi
dent. But his plan is still alive and,
despite huge obstacles, still being
viewed as Brazil’s best chance for
econom ic stability.

M

Katherine Ellison is the Miami Herald ’v
South America bureau chief in Rio de
Janeiro.

T he keystone o f the crusade is
a bold attem pt to “dollarize” the
economy, although no one in the
governm ent is eager to use that
word. W hat this m eans is that the
n atio n ’s all-but-useless currency,
the cruzeiro real, is to be converted
back into a genuine unit o f wealth.
The process has begun with the in
troduction o f the U nidade Real de
Valor (URV), a dollar-based index
now being used to establish the val
ues o f salaries and o ther im portant
contracts. O n July 1, according to
the plan, the URV itself will becom e
a new currency—the sixth new cur
rency in the past 14 years. It is to
be called the “real,” and worth
roughly a dollar.
I..............................................

I

...—

Thejoke spread that
the monetary reform
was the government’s
way of saying,
Together, we will
rob you. ”

Econom ist W inston Fritsch, one
o f Cardoso’s principal advisers at
the finance ministry, calls the proc
ess a kind o f “lobotom y” necessary
to cure Brazilians o f their inflation
ary expectations. “Money in Brazil
has ceased to be a unit o f account
o r store o f value,” he said. “So now

we are creating a currency in steps
to recreate in the population the
notion o f a currency that has real
value.” G overnm ent leaflets m arket
ing the plan have pressed this psy
chological approach. “Finally, a
new currency, strong and as re
spected— here and abroad—as
Brazil deserves,” the leaflets prom 
ised. “A real currency, to fill people
with pride.”
Justifiably hardened by their his
tory o f disappointm ents, however,
Brazilians have been slow to ju m p
on the bandwagon. In the week in
which Cardoso launched his plan,
the joke spread that URV was the
governm ent’s way o f saying, “Unidos roubaremos voces" (“Together, we
will rob you.”).
Such cynicism has threatened to
strangle Cardoso’s project in its in
fancy, as does what some politicians
view as its fatal flaw: i.e., while it
puts a lid on salaries, it gives no
guarantee that prices w on’t keep
shooting up. In early March, after
hearing the details o f Cardoso’s
strategy, union leaders threatened
strikes and leftist politicians de
m anded that the governm ent re
treat from what they charged was a
shock plan that placed all o f the
burden o f reform on workers’
shoulders. Part o f the unions’ fear
had already been realized in Feb
ruary when sellers, perhaps in an
ticipation o f a price freeze, raised
the cost o f basic foodstuffs by 53%,
well above the predicted 38% infla
tion for that m onth. The price of
beans, a Brazilian staple, rocketed
up by 179%, according to the news
magazine Veja, while the price of
onions soared by 126%.
Cardoso vowed that he would
no t freeze prices, a tactic th at has
failed in the past. Yet his advisers
insisted they could bully suppliers
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away from abusing strapped con
sumers. In what Fritsch called
“m oral suasion” and some news
papers have dubbed “fiscal ter
rorism ,” Fritsch said the finance
ministry could, if necessary, cut tar
iffs on exports by unruly firms, or
reduce subsidies. “Every company
has some dealings with the govern
m ent, so you can always find some
way to harass them ,” he said.
Cardoso had been preparing
the gro u n d for the URV for m onths
before he p u t it into practice, most
ly by raising taxes and designing
deep cuts in the federal budget.
With a balanced budget, the gov
ern m en t would no longer be forced
to p rin t m oney to cover its debts,
thus fueling inflation. N onethe
less—and this is the p lan’s most
serious problem —the ex-minister’s
budget has yet to be approved by
the congress, which is bogged down
by election-year intrigues and a
long-running investigation into a
massive corruption scandal o f its
m embers.
M ore bad news came in April,
when legislators acknowledged
they had at least tem porarily aban
doned a long-awaited and urgently
need ed constitutional revision. Car
doso had h o p ed to steer the proc
ess toward supporting his plan, by
m eans o f approval o f changes in
the tax laws, an overhaul o f the
b ankrupt social security system, and
the reversal o f a law that bans the
firing o f public employees. Now all
these m easures will have to wait.
This opposition leaves Cardoso
with perhaps one last weapon with
which to coax support for his pro
posal from the ruling elite. Many
believe th at if nothing is done soon
about the ram paging inflation, Bra
zil’s poor majority will give an over
w helm ing victory in O ctober to
Cardoso’s m ain rival, the socialist
labor leader Luiz Inacio “Lula” da
Silva, already by far the current
front-runner in all public opinion
polls. T he increasing fear o f a Lula
victory may have becom e the best
hope that Brazil’s aristocracy will at
last unite behind a stabilization
plan. ■
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Features: Mexico

Chiapas and the National Crisis
byJorge Castaneda

The Chiapas rebellion reflects a profound national crisis in Mexico. It reflects
a Mexico that, despite its deepening integration with the US, remains firmly
anchored in the Third World

ith the outcry of
“no que no, hijos de la
chingada," the feared
Mexican bronco
awoke from his leth
argy and submission
in the rem ote highlands of Chia
pas— the land of indigenous peo
ple and anthropologists, of huipiles
and syncretism. T he em ergence of
a Mexican guerrilla m ovem ent has
unleashed a political crisis for the
country, an image crisis outside of
Mexico and— the only positive re
sult im aginable—a crisis of con
science am ong a Mexican elite
separated by an abyss of centuries
from the indigenous masses that
have taken up arms.
Lacking better inform ation on
what the final outcom e will be—
though no do u b t tragic—and ex
am ining the insurrection with the
caution that is necessary for any
event o f this type in Mexico, four
reflections come to m ind. T he first
has to do with the nature and struc
ture o f the guerrilla force itself. In
contrast to the 1970s campesino up
risings in the state o f G uerrero, the
Chiapas rebels are genuine guerril
las and n o t simply one m ore group
of angry and insurrectionist peasants.

W

Jorge Castaneda is the author of Uto
pia U narm ed: T he Future of the
Latin Am erican Left (New York:
Knopf 1993).
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A lthough not all the m em bers
of the Ejercito Zapatista de Libera
tio n N ational (EZLN) carry the
powerful m odern weapons o f its
television spokespersons, several
thousand com batants form part of
a defined and coordinated struc
ture guided by a single leadership
with a politically consistent, albeit
archaic, discourse. T he Zapatistas’
organizational, logistical, public re
lations, and com m unications capac
ity and their tactical and military
strategy reveal that this group has
been preparing itself for years.
They have well-trained units and
qualified instructors. This is not a
m illenarian Jacquerie; it is a highly
current and contem porary guer
rilla group.

Chiapas abounded. In July and
August of 1993 the new spaper La
Jornada and the m agazine Proceso
published long articles regarding
battles in the Lacandona Jungle
and the town of Ocosingo. Carlos
M ontem ayor—the well-known
Mexican writer and an authority
on arm ed insurrections in Mex
ico— stated that “in those regions,
the m ountains have eyes.” Every
thing is known, and the Mexican in
telligence services— no m atter how
corrupt or repressive—have a welldeserved reputation for efficiency
and quickness. W hen they want to
capture som eone, discover some
thing, or infiltrate and disarticulate
a group, they do it well.

Sophisticated Warriors

The Chiapas rebels
are genuine guerrillas,
not simply one more
group of angry
and insurrectionist
peasants.
Second, the EZLN’s em ergence
in itself denotes either a functional
failure or an incom prehensible
mystery for the Mexican state ap
paratus. Almost three years ago,
rum ors of a guerrilla uprising in

No one understands how thousands
of chiapaneco campesinos, led by in
digenous and mestizo leaders from
both that region and the rest of the
country, were able to train and pre
pare for a com plex and trem en
dously am bitious operation without
raising any suspicions. This is even
less com prehensible if one rem em 
bers that the current secretary of
the interior and the m an responsi
ble for the security of the Mexican
state, Patrocinio Gonzalez Garrido,
served as governor of Chiapas until
the beginning of 1993; in reality he
has also retained political control
over his hom e state. A grave defi
ciency exists in the governm ent of

Carlos Salinas de Gortari that re
veals either an unconscious calcu
lation that purposely allowed the
eruption to achieve a specific politi
cal objective or an acute state of in
ternal decomposition.
Third, the Chiapas revolt sup
ports the argum ent o f those ob
stinate and m aligned critics and
skeptics who, since 1988, have in
sisted that the route taken by the
Salinas governm ent would lead,
sooner or later, to a m ajor crisis.
Such a crisis, they noted, would
occur, not in a country magically
propelled to the First World by
news m edia headlines and elite
trade agreem ents, but one firmly
anchored in the perm anent T hird
World within Mexico— that part of
the country that includes several
segregated nations, injustice and
inequality, authoritarianism and
corruption, and poverty and m ar
ginalization.

Deeper Crisis
T he Chiapas uprising is a symbol of
a m uch deeper crisis. It is neither an
exclusively ethnic ph enom enon nor
the product o f the undeniable pov
erty and backwardness o f the state
o f Chiapas. While Chiapas is one of
the m ost backward states in Mex
ico, it is also one of the four states
where the governm ent has concen
trated its efforts and resources to
fight poverty through its so-called
National Solidarity Program.
W hat gave rise to the guerrillas
in Chiapas was n o t only its back
wardness and the marginality and
isolation of its indigenous popu
lation but, above all, a political
problem . In Chiapas the Salinas
governm ent spent money, but the
corrupt, oligarchic, and authoritar
ian social and political structures
were m aintained and strengthened.
State authorities and the army itself
encouraged cattle ranchers to seize
land from the com m unities. The
security forces and, again, the army
repressed the indigenous peoples
without mercy: they violated hum an
rights, raped women, jailed leaders
and priests, b u rn ed towns and vil

lages, and left legitim ate ancestral
claims dangling. The typically eco
nom ic and despotic conception of
the Salinas governm ent resulted in
a policy that was doom ed to fail.
The chiapanecos, like millions of
o ther Mexicans, want m ore than a
trickle o f money—they want real re
sources. They also want to partici
pate in deciding how, by whom, and
where money will be spent. Above
all, they want to be treated with dig
nity, no t hum iliated, beaten, and
repressed.

Mexico cannot
continue to be
governed the way
it has been so far.
The appearance of a
guerrilla force means
that some Mexicans
do not have faith in
elections.

T he fourth and final reflection is
that Mexico cannot continue to be
governed the way it has been so
far. T he problem of Chiapas is
Mexico; it is no t social or economic,
bu t political. T he appearance o f a
guerrilla force—no m atter how
ephem eral it may prove to be—
m eans that there are Mexicans who
do not believe in the electoral route
to channel their dem ands. This was
already well known. Poll after poll
revealed that m ore than half o f all
voters do not believe in the trans
parency o f the electoral processes.
T he Salinas governm ent dedicated
five years, millions of dollars, thou
sands o f liters of ink, and an infinite
num ber of international friend
ships to destroying Cardenism o,
the only opposition force that
could have electorally channeled
the dem ands and discontent of

groups such as the ones in Chiapas.
C ardenism o was accused o f radi
calism, extremism, violence, and
anachronism , in the forlorn hope
that 90 million Mexicans would be
convinced or com pelled to fit with
in the confines of a country seem
ingly com posed of nothing but
m agnates and “yuppies” o f the Par
tido Revolucionario Institucional,
and Creole lawyers and middleclass supporters o f the Partido de
Accion Nacional. C uauhtem oc
Cardenas appeared as an evil to be
avoided at all costs—including de
mocracy, hum an rights, and inter
national image.

Several Evils
It is clear today, as many originally
thought, that Cardenas is the lesser
of several evils. The real evils—vio
lence, desperation, im potence, and
rage—are on G uerrero M ountain
in Chiapas, in the barrios o f Netzahualcoyotl, or in the barrancas of
Tijuana. T he one overwhelming
evil is the irrational and condem nable recourse to arms and the re
jection o f legality and the electoral
route. T he new configuration of
the Mexican political spectrum
that will em erge from Chiapas is
loyal to the real country. If the eter
nally postponed Mexican dem ocra
tization can occur, the indigenous
ire o f Chiapas and o ther rages and
resentm ents lodged within the endof-century Mexican mestizo will be
able to express themselves through
the ballot boxes. T he true evil will
have been avoided and the lesser
ones—reform ed Cardenistas, de
mocratized priistas, and provincial
panistas—would exist in a country
where everyone, including Com
m ander Marcos and the inhabi
tants o f San Juan Cham ula, would
fit. This would not be the worst de
velopm ent to stem from the take
over of San Cristobal de las Casas. ■

Editor’s Note: Translated, with permis
sion, by H em isphere staff from an edi
torial published in El Nuevo H erald
(Miami, Florida) on January 6, 1994.
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After Chiapas: The Indian Agenda
by Martin Edwin Andersen

he violence seem ed like
part o f a well-known script.
Masked young m en wear
ing baseball caps and bear
ing old rifles took control
of town squares in a poor
region far from the m odern com 
forts o f the capital city. Stunned
military and police, ja rre d from the
stupor of their New Year’s revelry,
called for reinforcements, then coun
terattacked. As propeller-driven
aircraft bom bed and strafed oncesleepy ham lets nestled in the m oun
tains, the estim ated 2,000 insurgents
shrank back into the protective rain
forest. Meanwhile, the governm ent
forces swelled to m ore than 10,000.
T he build-up was accom panied by
displays o f bodies—alleged to be
those of guerrillas—with hands
tied behind their backs and skulls
shattered by pointblank bullets. In
W ashington, strategic thinkers m ut
tered darkly about outside support
for the unheard-of rebels.
The bloody rebellion by native
Am ericans in the state of Chiapas
in southern Mexico proved to be
an international em barrassm ent
for a country widely praised for its
econom ic reforms. It also appeared
tim ed to underm ine President Car
los Salinas de Gortari ju st as the
N orth Am erican Free Trade Agree
m en t (NAFTA) was com ing into ef
fect. While the rebels o f the Ejercito
Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional—
nam ed for Emiliano Zapata, the
h ero o f the 1910 Mexican Revolu
tion—m elted into the surrounding
countryside, the governm ent retali-

T

Martin Edwin Andersen is a senior
consultant at the Washington, DCbased Centerfor Democracy and a
former professional staff member of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
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ated with claims o f foreign partici
pation in the uprising. From the
governm ent’s perspective, this was,
perhaps, the best way to explain
why the well-disciplined guerrillas
had even seized the square in San
Cristobal de las Casas (the second
largest city in Chiapas with some
90,000 p eo p le), bu t it was no t a
claim borne out by guerrilla casual
ties. T he dead insurgents bore the
physical features characteristic of
the reg io n ’s Mayan tribes.

The situation in
Chiapas mirrors the
condition of native
peoples in many areas
of Mexico, home to
Latin America’s
largest indigenous
population.

olution” inaugurated by Zapata
and others. T he guerrillas’ protest
against what they called the Salinas
governm ent’s complicity in rights
violations and the erosion o f their
land rights was intensified by wor
ries about what NAFTA will do to
the price o f corn— a staple—and by
a fear that m ultinational corpora
tions would be able to push those
rem aining off their lands.
T he situation in Chiapas mirrors
the condition of native peoples in
many areas o f Mexico, bom e to
Latin A m erica’s largest indigenous
population. More than a million
Mexican Indians speak no Spanish,
and eight times th at many use na
tive Indian languages as their pre
ferred idiom. Nearly 70% o f tbose
who live in rural areas are con
sidered by the governm ent to be
“m arginalized” (as the Mexican gov
ernm ent refers to its Indian com
m unities) , with nine in ten outside
the reach o f sanitation and sewer
age systems and thus victims of
intestinal disease.

Indian Needs
No one should be surprised by
the uprising in Chiapas. It is Mex
ico’s poorest state and the site of a
long-running series of violations
against the hum an rights of native
peoples. It is also the scene of a vir
tual assault by large landowners
against the small agricultural hold
ings o f the Mayan, Tzeltale, Zapoteco, Zoque, and o th er indigenous
com m unities o f the region. In re
cent years, wealthy landowners have
forced thousands off com m unal
farm lands, known as ejidos, which
according to official Mexican lore,
are one o f the m ost im portant so
cial gains o f the “Institutional Rev

To some observers, the Chiapas
revolt, com ing at the end o f the
UN “International Year of the
W orld’s Indigenous Peoples,” un
derscored the urgency of address
ing the needs of Latin A m erica’s
35-40 million Indians—particularly
their political rights an d the protec
tion of their lands a n d resources.
Victims o f poverty, violence, and
political and social marginaliza
tion, the plight of native peoples
has largely escaped the notice and
attention o f policymakers, both in
Latin America and in W ashington.
T he rebellion was tragic proof
of the risks posed by the failure of
governm ents to protect the politi-

cal, social, and econom ic rights of
native peoples. The degree to which
the Zapatistas struck a popular chord
th ro u g h o u t Mexico seem ed to do
as m uch with the widespread appeal
of their dem ands— the protection
of native lands, real democracy, and
the fair treatm ent o f native peo
ples—as with the puckish and im
passioned flair o f their enigm atic
leader, Subcom andante Marcos.

GDP PER CAPITA AND REAL WAGES
Index: 1980=100

The Native Agenda
The grito de Chiapas reflected the
serious problem s confronted by an
estim ated 300 m illion indigenous
peoples around the world. T he in
digenous agenda includes many of
the m ost intriguing and urgent
items th at n eed to be addressed
by policymakers as their countries
approach the twenty-first century.
These include:
■ the quest for broad and effective
participation in newly em erging
democracies;
■ hum an rights;
■ the growing recognition within
the international scientific com
munity o f the contribution o f tra
ditional knowledge, particularly
o f plant resources, to science and
technology;
■ mass m igration across interna
tional boundaries;
■ demilitarization;
■ environm ental protection; and
■ a new framework for the decen
tralization of decisionm aking
within nations, allowing for m ore
effective local self-governance.
As the seemingly endless stream
o f new spaper articles and editorials
about Chiapas m ade clear, the in
digenous revolution is here. The
question is will it be largely n o n 
violent and beneficial to indige
nous and tribal people, as well as
the rest o f hum anity, or will it re
sult in an endless series o f “lowintensity conflicts.”
Indian advocates point ou t that,
if violent episodes like that o f Chia
pas are to be kept from recurring,
a systematic effort needs to be
m ade to help indigenous peoples
living in fragile environm ents to

Source: UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean
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Source: UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean

conserve their resources. Part of
the solution is to ensure them re
source rights (access to land, water,
and fu el), to prom ote their ability
to defend their land and resource
base, and to help them m eet their
needs in a m odern world w ithout
losing their tim e-honored resource
m anagem ent m ethods. T he con
tinued progression o f the global
m arch to dem ocracy as well as the
protection o f o u r com m on natural

inheritance requires helping in
digenous peoples to take m eaning
ful and representative roles in their
own governments.
The Chiapas revolt spawned sev
eral myths, which policymakers can
ignore at their peril. T he Salinas ad
m inistration was protecting its own
vested interests when it dismissed
pre-New Year’s reports o f guerrilla
activities as fabrications generated
by its opponents and the opposition
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INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA
Country

Total Population
(Millions)

Argentina

31.9

1

.2

10

6.5

66

Belize
Bolivia
Brazil

Indigenous Population
(Percentage)

150.8

Chile

12.8

Colombia

31.9

Costa Rica

9

1

3.0

1

10.3

21

El Salvador

5.1

21

Guatemala

9.1

50

Ecuador

Guayana

.4

1

Honduras

5.1

7

86,4

11

Nicaragua

3.5

3

Panama

2.4

6

Mexico

Paraguay
Peru
Suriname
Uruguay
Venezuela

4.5

3

21.4

40

.8

3

3.0

—

19.3

1

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, 1990

to NAFTA. It is now clear, however,
th at the Mexican army was involved
in a classic, and brutal, counter
insurgency effort in the m ountains
o f Chiapas th ro u ghout 1993.
Following the revolt, the Salinas
governm ent tried to evade respon
sibility for the conditions that led
to the revolt by claiming the guer
rillas had outside contacts and for
eign supporters in their ranks. The
causes o f the revolt, however, were
clearly Mexican in character and
content. M anuel Cam acho Solis—
Salinas’s own special negotiator—
gave lie to governm ent claims that
the Zapatistas were led by foreigners
by describing the rebels as hom e
grown insurgents; his use o f the
term “arm y” w hen describing the
insurgents flew in the face o f gov
ern m en t claims that the guerrillas
were a band o f “lawbreakers.”
Finally, while the Zapatistas have
stolen the headlines, m ost indige
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nous activism throughout the hem i
sphere has been nonviolent, if not
always peaceful. T he Zapatistas’
leftist rhetoric should not be the
prism through which all indige
nous activism is evaluated. Indian
issues are not, in the main, either
“leftist” or “rightist,” although
some activists may be thus charac
terized. At the m ost fundam ental
level, the indigenous agenda is one
of political and econom ic em power
m ent and, to a certain degree, of
cultural sovereignty.
T here is also the danger that the
New Year’s Day revolt will becom e
a pretext for spending m ore on the
military, no t ju st in Mexico, but
throughout Latin America, and
that indigenous activism may be
come the new raison d ’etre for
army involvem ent in internal secu
rity. Chiapas has becom e the sym
bol of what can go w rong when
armies—even comparatively small

ones—attem pt to carry o u t tasks
o ther than the defense o f the nation-state against external threats.
Inappropriate roles and missions,
no t necessarily size, are what make
militaries potentially dangerous ac
tors outside civilian control. T he
lack of effective recourse to a func
tioning legal system, coupled with
the em ploym ent o f military forces
as a virtual army o f occupation, can
be seen as an open invitation to the
disenfranchised and disaffected to
jo in the Zapatista rebels.
T h roughout Latin America the
absence o f a unifying com m unist
threat has sent militaries scram
bling to define new threats to se
curity as a m eans o f holding onto
budgets and prestige. Despite the
fact that Mexico has one o f the low
est p er capita military expenditures
in Latin America, the lack of an ap
propriate role and mission for its
army is pushing the force to de
m and a greater say in m ajor na
tional decisions, the antecham ber
o f militarism. This tren d is exacer
bated by a financial independence
that dates back to the Mexican Rev
olution, and now, by the events in
Chiapas.
T bat the military’s own role in
internal security in Chiapas itself
contributed to popular support for
the Zapatista insurgents is evidenced
by a 1993 M innesota Advocates for
H um an Rights report about con
ditions in the southern Mexican
state. Despite a constitutional pro
hibition against military involve
m ent in dom estic affairs, the rep o rt
notes “troubling . . . signs of re
newed involvem ent of the military
in civilian affairs during the adm in
istration o f President Carlos Salinas
de Gortari. . . . A nother disturbing
developm ent is the deploym ent of
the army am ong the indigenous
populations o f southern Mexico—
especially in Chiapas—where longsim m ering land conflicts have been
aggravated by the governm ent’s
agrarian policy. . . . [L]awless prac
tices o f tbe Mexican military have
becom e increasingly tolerated at
the highest levels o f the Mexican
governm ent. . . . T he growing ac-

ceptance of lawless military involve
m en t in detentions and searches
am ong civilian populations is a
dangerous developm ent.”
T rained to employ m axim um
force to destroy an “enem y,” utiliz
ing forces that are largely alien to
the com m unity in which they are
deployed, illegal acts by the Mexi
can army were almost inevitable—
all the m ore so once the guerrilla
insurgency burst forth with unsus
pected force. In testimony before
the US Congress on February 2,
1994, Assistant Secretary o f State
for H um an Rights Jo h n Shattuck
pointed o u t that, despite reports of
hundreds killed in the fighting in
Chiapas, the governm ent has never
produced a single wounded prisoner!
According to many knowledge
able observers, the Salinas govern
m en t has increasingly used the
army to intervene in political and
labor disputes, as well as a m ajor
actor in the fight against narcotics
trafficking. T he M innesota Advo
cates rep o rt notes: “T he militariza
tion o f the drug war is, in large
m easure, a result o f the govern
m e n t’s inability or unwillingness to
pursue serious reform o f the po
lice,” even as the army has itself
been im plicated in alm ost surreal
episodes o f narcotics-related mis
conduct, including the m urder of
law enforcem ent officers. M ean
while, in m any precincts, antinar
cotics police have had to buy their
own am m unition, even though
m ost local police make a m ere
$200 a m onth.
T he events in Chiapas raised
specific issues th at are broadly rep
resentative o f the challenges facing
indigenous peoples throughout the
continent: tbe political em power
m en t o f indigenous peoples; the
protection o f their land rights;
indigenous rights and the adm in
istration o f justice; and forest m an
agem ent and the protection of
indigenous cultures.

Political Empowerment
Bringing “m arginalized” peoples
into the dem ocratic process is a key

com ponent for the consolidation
o f elected governm ents. T hrough
out Latin America—but m ost cer
tainly in Guatemala, Ecuador, Peru,
and Bolivia—dem ocratic participa
tion cannot be limited to areas of
relative privilege if the long-term
prospects for dem ocracy are to be
secure. New and em erging dem oc
racies can rem ain healthy only if
they are fully representative.

Despite reports of
hundreds killed in the
figliting in Chiapas,
the government never
produced a single
wounded prisoner.

In Guatem ala nearly 60% o f the
country’s 10 m illion people are de
scendants o f the ancient Mayas, yet
there are only six indigenous m em 
bers o f the congress. Ind ep en d en t
observers say one im portant factor
in the low tu rn o u t in G uatem ala’s
crucial January referendum on con
stitutional reform s was the fact the
ballots were printed only in Span
ish, although hundreds o f thou
sands o f potential voters speak only
indigenous languages.
In Ecuador there is a single na
tive Am erican congressm an. And
in Bolivia, o f the 130 m em bers of
parliam ent, only three are indige
nous, a fact am eliorated only par
tially by the 1993 election of Victor
H ugo C ardenas—a recognized na
tive American leader— to the vice
presidency.

Protection of Land Rights
Indian hom elands—in many cases
the last rem ote forests, savannas,
and wetlands o f Latin America—
are facing a ruthless onslaught by
lawless cattle ranchers, loggers, and

landless peasants. Experts say—and
the experience of Chiapas seems to
bear out— that securing legal pro
tection for their lands, and thus
their way o f life and the ecosystem
that sustains it, is the greatest chal
lenge faced by native peoples. In
Mexico an estim ated 70% o f In
dian land is forest. For example,
the 50,000 T arahum ara Indians of
C hihuahua’s Sierra M adre O cciden
tal live in one o f the richest biosys
tems in N orth America. Both the
ecosystem, with its stunning variety
o f plants and animals, and the Tara
hum ara Indians are at risk—victims
o f an unholy alliance o f large land
owners and drug traffickers. Inef
fective policing by the Mexican
army has helped to make the
sprawling state on the US border a
lawless cesspool o f corruption.
In places such as C entral Amer
ica, where the population is ex
pected to double within the next
25 years, the increasing shortage of
what were once “fro n tier” lands
m eans that com m ercial agricul
tural interests can only expand at
the expense o f native peoples and
their control over their own territo
ries. In Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, and
elsewhere, land issues are at the
forefront o f the indigenous agenda.
An im portant part o f helping
indigenous peoples protect their
lands is to help provide them with
the information and support needed
to create accurate land-use maps,
thus dem olishing a racist myth that
endures from the Spanish colonial
era: that the rem aining forests, sa
vannas, and wetlands are “un in 
habited,” and therefore there for
the taking.
O ne prom ising effort has been
undertaken by native peoples in
H onduras and Panam a, assisted by
the nongovernm ental organization
Native Lands. In both countries, In
dians have escaped the invisibility
myth by creating graphic, detailed
records o f their lands, including
who lives there and how the land is
used. By employing scientific maps
and technical evaluations, native
peoples can make credible cases
for legalizing com m unal hom e
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lands, stanching the invasions of
their lands by landless peasants and
m ultinational com panies, and re
solving on m ore favorable terms the
relationship between Indian hom e
lands and national protected areas.

Administration of Justice
T he revolt in Chiapas has helped
to focus attention on the need for
new rules and new laws governing
how countries treat their Indian na
tions and o th er indigenous peoples.
In countries as diverse as Guate
mala, Nicaragua, and Peru, native
Americans continue to be victim
ized by military-run internal secu
rity forces. Both the military and
insurgent groups subject native
Americans to forced recruitm ent
and violence. The lack o f repre
sentative legal systems at the com
m unity level m eans the denial to
native peoples of the full protec
tion of the law, while indigenous
lands continue to be overrun, con
fiscated, or threatened.
H um an rights advocates point
out it is necessary to strengthen ci
vilian justice systems—including po
lice—at the local level in ord er to
effectively confront abuses. Native
Am erican dem ands for legal protec
tion through the creation and sup
p o rt of com m unity and regional
justice systems, including law en
forcem ent, m irror the dem ocratic
experience o f the US itself, where
law enforcem ent is overwhelmingly
civilian and local (as opposed to
many countries o f Latin America,
where the arm ed forces still con
trol the police). T he creation of
and support for local adm inistra
tion o f justice helps to ensure com 
m unity em pow erm ent on issues of
vital concern, and is directly re
lated to questions of dem ilitariza
tion and hum an rights.

Forest Management and the
Protection of Indigenous Cultures
T here is a growing recognition in
Latin America o f the needs of in
digenous peoples who use forests
as the basis for their livelihood,
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social organization, or cultural
identity. These groups and estab
lished local com m unities that
depend on forest resources have
an econom ic stake in sustainable
forest use. T he international com
munity can and should help in
digenous peoples increase their
capacity to protect their own lands
and thus support sustainable re
source use and the protection of
the environm ent.

In countries as
diverse as Guatemala,
Nicaragua, and Peru,
native Americans
continue to be
victimized by
military-run internal
security forces. Both
the military and
insurgent groups
subject them to forced
recruitment and
violence.
Am ong those policy considera
tions deserving o f support and assis
tance are:
■ the recognition o f indigenous
peoples and local com m unity resi
dents’ rights and cultural identity;
* the extension o f an equal oppor
tunity to indigenous peoples for
full participation in their coun
try’s life, including the life o f the
forest;
■ the exchange o f inform ation
(with m utual protection o f intel
lectual property rights) between
external research and technology
generation and locally developed
technology and indigenous knowl
edge, as a m eans o f m ore sustain
ably m anaging forest resources;

■ em powering indigenous peoples
and residents of local com m u
nities to ensure their effective
participation in planning and
decisionm aking related to the life
of the forest, utilizing, as m uch as
possible, the help o f local and in
ternational nongovernm ental or
ganizations and the private sector.
These efforts should also in
clude the definition and strength
ening of the participation and
stake of indigenous peoples in lo
cal, national, and international
economies, particularly in the sus
tainable harvest o f both tim ber (in
cluding fuel wood) and nontim ber
forest products and services, and
the facilitation and furthering of
the cultural, educational, and eco
nom ic self-sufficiency of indige
nous peoples.

Chiapas, and Beyond
D uring the Bush adm inistration,
the US was seen as unsym pathetic
to UN efforts to address the indige
nous agenda. T he Clinton adminis
tration also got off to a slow start
when the US delegation at the
Ju n e 1993 hum an rights sum m it in
Vienna was no t even prepared to
discuss indigenous rights (the sum
m it’s second hottest topic after
w om en’s rights).
T he Clinton adm inistration
should clearly state that it is US pol
icy to assist indigenous peoples, par
ticularly in em erging dem ocracies
and in nations in which native peo
ples are either a num erical m ajor
ity or a significant minority. O ne
prom ising developm ent came in
late January, when the 1993 State
D epartm ent country reports on hu
m an rights featured, for the first
time, beefed up coverage o f indige
nous rights (thanks to legislation
sponsored by form er senator Alan
C ranston [D-CA]).
W here possible, native peoples
m ust be included in sustainable de
velopm ent strategies, particularly
those that would enhance the pro
tection o f rain forests or o th er envi
ronm ental treasures. The Clinton
adm inistration should also vigor-

ously cham pion indigenous inter
ests and concerns within the m ulti
lateral developm ent banks and
international trade organizations.
As a recent Congressional study
on the im pact o f US foreign assis
tance shows, the Agency for Inter
national Developm ent has done
lim ited work in providing aid to in
digenous peoples. US efforts, how
ever, should reach ou t to m eet the
special needs o f indigenous peoples,
rath er than hoping they benefit in
directly from program s aim ed at
rural peoples o r the poor. G reater
em phasis should be m ade on pro
grams th at facilitate indigenous
institution-building and econom ic
em powerm ent; fortify cultural iden
tity; increase technical and profes
sional training; and strengthen
legal rights.
For better or worse, events in
southern Mexico have riveted our
attention at the p oint of a gun—
albeit a rusty shotgun. T heir m ean
ing— the violence, the marginali
zation, the potential for m ore
resources to be funneled to the
security forces and away from the
people—needs, however, to be
juxtaposed with recent develop
m ents in Bolivia. T here the newly
elected presidential ticket included
an indigenous leader whose school
teacher wife still wears the tradi
tional dress—long black braid,
m ultilayered skirt, felt shoes, and
a bowler hat—o f the A ndean Altiplano. The August 1993 inaugural
address of vice president Victor
Hugo Cardenas—whose presence
on the ticket was instrum ental in
achieving President Gonzalo San
chez de Losada’s wide m argin of
victory—was given n o t only in
Spanish, b u t also in the native
languages o f Aymara, Q uechua,
and Guarani.
“After 500 years o f colonial si
lence and after 168 o f republican
exclusion, we now speak up to tell
o u r tru th ,” C ardenas said. “Democ
racy in a country th at is m ultieth
nic, pluricultural, and plurilingual
ought also to be m ultiethnic, pluri
cultural, and plurilingual. . . . A
tree grows from its own roots.” ■

Indian Rights in Latin America
Guatemala
Indigenous people comprise one-half of the population but remain largely out
side the country's political, economic, social and cultural mainstream. Indige
nous people suffered most of the serious human rights abuses described
throughout this report---- Although indigenous people are accorded equal
rights by the Constitution, in practice they have only minimal participation in
decisions affecting their lands, culture, traditions, and allocation of natural re
sources---Brazil
Brazil's approximately 250,000 Indians, who speak 170 different languages. . .
have only a very limited ability to participate in decisions affecting their lands,
cultures, traditions, and the allocation of natural resources.. ., [I]ndigenous
groups are marginalized from the political process---- [Tjllegal mining and
timber cutting are a constant problem on Indian lands. . . . [T]wo [gold min
ers] taken into custody [for the murder of 16 Yanomami Indians] were re
leased on December 29 when their trial was delayed owing to difficulty in
locating witnesses. There have been no convictions, however, in any previous
case involving the murder of Indians___
Chile
In 1993 Congress passed a law that was drafted by a committee composed of
representatives of the various indigenous groups, recognizing the ethnic diver
sity of the indigenous populations. It replaced a law that emphasized assimila
tion, and it gives them a greater voice in decisions affecting their lands,
cultures and traditions---- The population which identifies itself as indigenous
(nearly I million, according to the 1992 census) remains separated from the
rest of society, largely because of historical, cultural, educational, and geo
graphical factors... .

The degree to which indigenous peoples participate in the political process,
their exercise of civil rights, and the extent of their control over natural re
sources and land varies widely from one ethnic group to another, and from
one region of the country to another. The indigenous population, estimated at
100,000, is concentrated at the northern and southern extremities of the coun
try.. . . In 1987 Congress passed a law designed to return Indian lands. It has
yet to be implemented. . ..

Mexico
The Government encourages indigenous groups, many of which do not speak
Spanish, to participate in political life, and it is respectful of their desire to re
tain elements of their traditional lifestyle---- [T]hese groups remain largely
outside the country’s political and economic mainstream, a result of longstand
ing patterns of economic and social development, and in many cases their abil
ity to participate in decisions affecting their lands, cultural traditions, and the
allocation of natural resources is negligible. At the beginning of 1994, these
problems were particularly highlighted by an armed uprising in Chiapas state,.

Editor’s Note: Excerptsfrom the 1993 State Department country reports on human rights,
whichfor thefirst time included extensive reporting on the political, economic, and cul
tural rights of indigenous peoples, as required by the Cranston Amendment.
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The New Agrarian Reform
by Othon Banos Ramirez

exico’s new agrarian
reform law was cre
ated to end not only
the social redistribu
tion o f rural prop
erties, bu t also the
intervention o f the state in the in
ternal life of the ejidos (collectively
owned agricultural properties) and
rural com m unities in general. The
Mexican governm ent expects that
these reform s will stimulate the
m odernization o f the agrarian
economy. U ndoubtedly the new
law, which went into effect in Feb
ruary 1992, inaugurates a new stage
in Mexican agrarian policy. Since
the revolution of 1910-40, that pol
icy has revolved around the legal
regularization o f campesino owner
ship o f land, a focus that gave rise
to the ejidos. Today, the ejidos num 
b er 28,000 and com prise 50% of
M exico’s cultivable land.

The Farm Crisis
Mexico has been facing an agricul
tural crisis since the 1970s. In re
sponse, President Carlos Salinas de
Gortari has chosen the m ost practi
cal—and perhaps the only—option:
the fundam ental transform ation of
the ejido system. Since 1988 Salinas
has insisted that “the massive re
distribution o f rural property has
ended. W hoever claims t h a t . . . mil
lions o f hectares [rem ain] to be re-

Othon Banos Ramirez is a professor and
researcher at the Centro de Investigaciones Regionales “Dr. Hideyo Noguchi”
of the Universidad Autonoma de Yu
catan in Merida, Mexico. He is the
author o/Cam pesinos y sociedad:
ayer y hoy (Universidad Autonoma
de Yucatan, 1992).
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distributed is lying to the almost
two million persons who seek such
land and to the m ore than four
million agricultural workers.” The
key objectives of his agrarian pro
gram are fourfold:
■ to ensure the security o f property
holdings;
■ to reverse the growth of small
holdings by prom oting the estab
lishm ent o f producer associations
based on the investm ent o f pri
vate capital;
■ to reduce governm ent subsidies
for agricultural production; and
■ to reduce the state’s role in agri
cultural production and commerce,
including the dism antling of
parastatal agencies in agriculture.

m ain institutional linkages with the
countryside, the Secretaria de Agri
culture y Recursos Hidraulicos and
the Banco Nacional Rural.
T he new politics o f agrarian
reform leaves m ost campesinos ex
tremely vulnerable. For example, in
Yucatan, m arket-oriented reform s
in 1990 left many henequen-producing ejidatarios w ithout credit
and unable to harvest their crop.
Moreover, by forcing them to seek
wage work on an individual basis,
the reform u n d ercu t the collective
organization that had been the ba
sis o f what little political leverage
they previously exercised. These
serious problem s have affected
corn, citrus, and vegetable pro
ducers as well.

Th e new agrarian
reform leaves most
campesinos extremely
vulnerable. It leaves
the majority of them
withoutfinancial
credit, forces them to
seek wage work, and
undermines their
political leverage.

T he governm ent’s posture is to give
preferential treatm ent to the most
productive ejidos (which are located
mainly in n o rth ern M exico), at the
expense o f self-sufficient ejidos (lo
cated mainly in central Mexico)
and poor ejidos (which are the ma
jority o f ejidos nationwide and are
located mainly in the so u th ). By
providing m inim al credit for the
cultivation of poor ejido land, the
governm ent does n o t prom ote their
productivity, bu t merely delays the
m igratory exit o f the rural popula
tion in the ejido com m unities and
m aintains its political clientele in
the countryside.
In the context o f the presidential
election o f August 1994, the latter
is especially crucial given n o t only
the Chiapas rebellion b u t also the
assassination o f the Partido Revo
lucionario Institucional’s official
presidential candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio, both which have
increased the urgency o f m aintain

Preferential Treatment

As part o f this process, the Salinas
adm inistration has been restructur
ing the Instituto Mexicano del Cafe
and reorienting the functions of
CONASUPO (National Basic Foods
Company) and the governm ent’s

ing the party’s traditional electoral
m achinery in the provinces. To
achieve this objective, the govern
m en t has increased its social ex
penditures through its National
Solidarity Program , which targets
the urban poor, peasants, and
indigenous peoples with various
developm ent projects for sewage
and potable water, health, educa
tion, food distribution, electrifica
tion, street paving, housing, and
soft loans for low-income rural
producers.
T he new agrarian reform ap
pears favorable to those ejidos with
the greatest potential for produc
tivity, some o f which may be trans
form ed into som ething like the
cattle project o f Nuevo Leon in
n o rth ern Mexico. In this agro
industrial enterprise involving 336
associated producers, private initia
tive invested m ore than $6 million
in ejido lands, with profits appar
ently in excess o f $2 million in
1991. But this highly successful,
highly publicized project is a strik
ing exception to the rule. In gen
eral the establishm ent o f such
complexes of associated producers
has been unsuccessful unless the
state itself has played an active role.
According to many experts, such
enterprises are m ere fronts for
large-scale agricultural land rental
by private investors who m aintain
control over their business opera
tions. Foreign investm ent u n d er
these arrangem ents has principally
occurred through “contract agricul
tu re ” in export horticulture.

Contradictory Reactions
Over the m edium and long run
the new agrarian law will cause di
verse and contradictory reactions
according to the specific agricul
tural setting and product. Focusing
on ejidos, we can foresee the em er
gence o f an extrem ely com plicated
social problem th at is intimately
tied to M exico’s politics, culture,
and economy. The Mexican gov
ern m en t recognizes that, o f the na
tio n ’s population o f 85 million, at
least 41 m illion persons live in pov

erty, and of these 17 m illion live in
extrem e poverty. Many o f the ex
tremely poor are small ejidatarios.

In opening up new
market opportunities
fo r Mexican agriculture
while failing to
prepare or support
ejidatarios, the
Salinas administration
is abandoning
thousands of poor
campesinos, leaving
them with few
prospects.

Two perspectives have em erged
concerning the “reform o f agrarian
reform .” An optimistic view affirms
that, thanks to the new legislation,
m ore private investm ent will flow
into agriculture, thereby m odern
izing the sector and boosting its
productivity and output. T he pes
simistic view argues that the new
law will cause a massive sale o f ejido
landholdings that will inevitably re
sult in the concentration o f rural
property in the hands of a small
circle o f wealthy and powerful
owners and accelerate the migra
tion o f the countryside’s poor peo
ple to cities in Mexico and the US.
A lthough it is still too early to tell,
neither extrem e has yet occurred,
though trends suggesting the valid
ity o f both sides o f the argum ent
have em erged.
With respect to the N orth Ameri
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
Mexican authorities have yet to
publicize a coherent plan for pre
paring the n atio n ’s agricultural

sector for com petition with the
business giants to the north. In the
ory, the ending o f governm ent sub
sidies, technical support, and o th er
forms o f aid to small agricultural
producers will be m ore than com 
pensated by a surge in private
dom estic and foreign capital, the
m odernization o f technology, and
access to larger and m ore lucrative
markets. In the best o f cases, how
ever, very few campesinos will im
prove their econom ic standing. T he
great majority will becom e marginal
ized. Indeed, from the standpoint
of governm ent policymakers, tradi
tional campesinos pose an obstacle
to national econom ic developm ent.
The politics o f the new agrarian
reform seeks to elim inate this ob
stacle by transform ing traditional
campesinos into either “small farm 
ers” of the US variety o r a cheap,
ejido-anchored rural labor force for
highly capitalized agriculture.
In this setting, the new agrarian
reform could lead to the worsening
o f the socioeconom ic polarization
o f Mexican agriculture and to con
siderable growth in the political
clout o f large agricultural en ter
prises. In opening up new m arket
opportunities for Mexican agricul
ture while failing to prepare or
support ejidatarios, the Salinas ad
m inistration is abandoning thou
sands o f poor campesinos, leaving
them with few prospects beyond
m ere survival and turning them
into a low-wage subsidy for both
m odernized agriculture and the
m anufacturing and service sectors.
The new agrarian reform is
integral to a policy o f accelerated
introduction o f advanced m ethods
in agricultural production, thereby
preparing Mexico for a new stage
of econom ic developm ent and,
through NAFTA, econom ic inte
gration with the US and Canada.
This policy prom ises greater pro
ductivity, but fewer jobs. Poor cam
pesinos will end up losing what little
they have and, facing even m ore ex
trem e poverty in the countryside,
will exit en masse to the cities—in
cluding those cities across the bor
der to the north. ■
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exico’s new agrarian
reform law was cre
ated to end not only
the social redistribu
tion o f rural prop
erties, bu t also the
intervention o f the state in the in
ternal life of the ejidos (collectively
owned agricultural properties) and
rural com m unities in general. The
Mexican governm ent expects that
these reform s will stimulate the
m odernization o f the agrarian
economy. U ndoubtedly the new
law, which went into effect in Feb
ruary 1992, inaugurates a new stage
in Mexican agrarian policy. Since
the revolution of 1910-40, that pol
icy has revolved around the legal
regularization o f campesino owner
ship o f land, a focus that gave rise
to the ejidos. Today, the ejidos num 
b er 28,000 and com prise 50% of
M exico’s cultivable land.

The Farm Crisis
Mexico has been facing an agricul
tural crisis since the 1970s. In re
sponse, President Carlos Salinas de
Gortari has chosen the m ost practi
cal—and perhaps the only—option:
the fundam ental transform ation of
the ejido system. Since 1988 Salinas
has insisted that “the massive re
distribution o f rural property has
ended. W hoever claims t h a t . . . mil
lions o f hectares [rem ain] to be re-
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distributed is lying to the almost
two million persons who seek such
land and to the m ore than four
million agricultural workers.” The
key objectives of his agrarian pro
gram are fourfold:
■ to ensure the security o f property
holdings;
■ to reverse the growth of small
holdings by prom oting the estab
lishm ent o f producer associations
based on the investm ent o f pri
vate capital;
■ to reduce governm ent subsidies
for agricultural production; and
• to reduce the state’s role in agri
cultural production and commerce,
including the dism antling of
parastatal agencies in agriculture.

m ain institutional linkages with the
countryside, the Secretaria de Agri
culture y Recursos Hidraulicos and
the Banco Nacional Rural.
T he new politics of agrarian
reform leaves m ost campesinos ex
tremely vulnerable. For example, in
Yucatan, m arket-oriented reform s
in 1990 left many henequen-producing ejidatarios w ithout credit
and unable to harvest their crop.
Moreover, by forcing them to seek
wage work on an individual basis,
the reform u n d ercu t the collective
organization that had been the ba
sis o f what little political leverage
they previously exercised. These
serious problem s have affected
corn, citrus, and vegetable pro
ducers as well.

The new agrarian
reform leaves most
campesinos extremely
vulnerable. It leaves
the majority of them
withoutfinancial
credit, forces them to
seek wage work, and
undermines their
political leverage.

T he governm ent’s posture is to give
preferential treatm ent to the most
productive ejidos (which are located
mainly in n o rth ern Mexico), at the
expense o f self-sufficient ejidos (lo
cated mainly in central Mexico)
and poor ejidos (which are the ma
jority o f ejidos nationwide and are
located mainly in the so u th ). By
providing m inim al credit for the
cultivation of poor ejido land, the
governm ent does n o t prom ote their
productivity, bu t merely delays the
migratory exit o f the rural popula
tion in the ejido com m unities and
m aintains its political clientele in
the countryside.
In the context o f the presidential
election o f August 1994, the latter
is especially crucial given n o t only
the Chiapas rebellion b u t also the
assassination o f the Partido Revo
lucionario Institucional’s official
presidential candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio, both which have
increased the urgency o f m aintain

Preferential Treatment

As part o f this process, the Salinas
adm inistration has been restructur
ing the Instituto Mexicano del Cafe
and reorienting the functions of
CONASUPO (National Basic Foods
Company) and the governm ent’s

ing the party’s traditional electoral
m achinery in the provinces. To
achieve this objective, the govern
m en t has increased its social ex
penditures through its National
Solidarity Program , which targets
the urban poor, peasants, and
indigenous peoples with various
developm ent projects for sewage
and potable water, health, educa
tion, food distribution, electrifica
tion, street paving, housing, and
soft loans for low-income rural
producers.
T he new agrarian reform ap
pears favorable to those ejidos with
the greatest potential for produc
tivity, some o f which may be trans
form ed into som ething like the
cattle project o f Nuevo Leon in
n o rth ern Mexico. In this agro
industrial enterprise involving 336
associated producers, private initia
tive invested m ore than $6 million
in ejido lands, with profits appar
ently in excess o f $2 million in
1991. But this highly successful,
highly publicized project is a strik
ing exception to the rule. In gen
eral the establishm ent o f such
complexes of associated producers
has been unsuccessful unless the
state itself has played an active role.
According to many experts, such
enterprises are m ere fronts for
large-scale agricultural land rental
by private investors who m aintain
control over their business opera
tions. Foreign investm ent u n d er
these arrangem ents has principally
occurred through “contract agricul
tu re ” in export horticulture.

Contradictory Reactions
Over the m edium and long run
the new agrarian law will cause di
verse and contradictory reactions
according to the specific agricul
tural setting and product. Focusing
on ejidos, we can foresee the em er
gence o f an extrem ely com plicated
social problem th at is intimately
tied to M exico’s politics, culture,
and economy. The Mexican gov
ern m en t recognizes that, o f the na
tio n ’s population o f 85 million, at
least 41 m illion persons live in pov

erty, and o f these 17 m illion live in
extrem e poverty. Many o f the ex
tremely poor are small ejidatarios.

In opening up new
market opportunities
fo r Mexican agriculture
while failing to
prepare or support
ejidatarios, the
Salinas administration
is abandoning
thousands of poor
campesinos, leaving
diem with few
prospects.

Two perspectives have em erged
concerning the “reform o f agrarian
reform .” An optimistic view affirms
that, thanks to the new legislation,
m ore private investm ent will flow
into agriculture, thereby m odern
izing the sector and boosting its
productivity and output. T he pes
simistic view argues that the new
law will cause a massive sale o f ejido
landholdings that will inevitably re
sult in the concentration o f rural
property in the hands of a small
circle o f wealthy and powerful
owners and accelerate the migra
tion o f the countryside’s poor peo
ple to cities in Mexico and the US.
Although it is still too early to tell,
neith er extrem e has yet occurred,
though trends suggesting the valid
ity o f both sides o f the argum ent
have em erged.
With respect to the N orth Ameri
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
Mexican authorities have yet to
publicize a coherent plan for pre
paring the n atio n ’s agricultural

sector for com petition with the
business giants to the north. In the
ory, the ending of governm ent sub
sidies, technical support, and o th er
forms o f aid to small agricultural
producers will be m ore than com
pensated by a surge in private
dom estic and foreign capital, the
m odernization o f technology, and
access to larger and m ore lucrative
markets. In the best o f cases, how
ever, very few campesinos will im
prove their econom ic standing. T he
great majority will becom e marginal
ized. Indeed, from the standpoint
of governm ent policymakers, tradi
tional campesinos pose an obstacle
to national econom ic developm ent.
T he politics o f the new agrarian
reform seeks to elim inate this ob
stacle by transform ing traditional
campesinos into either “small farm 
ers” of the US variety or a cheap,
e/ido-anchored rural labor force for
highly capitalized agriculture.
In this setting, the new agrarian
reform could lead to the worsening
of the socioeconom ic polarization
o f Mexican agriculture and to con
siderable growth in the political
clout o f large agricultural en ter
prises. In opening up new m arket
opportunities for Mexican agricul
ture while failing to prepare or
support ejidatarios, the Salinas ad
m inistration is abandoning thou
sands o f poor campesinos, leaving
them with few prospects beyond
m ere survival and turning them
into a low-wage subsidy for both
m odernized agriculture and the
m anufacturing and service sectors.
The new agrarian reform is
integral to a policy o f accelerated
introduction o f advanced m ethods
in agricultural production, thereby
preparing Mexico for a new stage
of econom ic developm ent and,
through NAFTA, econom ic inte
gration with the US and Canada.
This policy prom ises greater pro
ductivity, but fewer jobs. Poor cam
pesinos will end up losing what little
they have and, facing even m ore ex
trem e poverty in the countryside,
will exit en masse to the cities—in
cluding those cities across the bor
der to the north. ■
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War and Accountability in Guatemala
by Walter Gillis Peacock

B etw een Tw o A rm ies in th e Ixil
T o w n s o f G u a te m a la
by David Stoll. Columbia University
Press, 1993. $47.50 cloth; $17.50paper.
n Guatem ala during the late
1970s and early 1980s, the
team o f sociologists with which
I was doing research was often
stopped by the military or na
tional police at unexpected
checkpoints in the highlands. Even
though field work is always com pli
cated by unanticipated difficulties,
these encounters were dangerous
with high levels o f uncertainty. On
one occasion a young officer pulled
an extra pistol from the small o f his
back, moved toward our vehicle,
and told us we would give him a
ride to the next town and that only
Spanish would be spoken. His “re
quest” was n o t questioned. In these
instances, the limited restraint dis
played was probably due to our US
passports. Unfortunately, no such
protection existed for tens o f thou
sands who were subject to the bru
tal excesses of G uatem ala’s military
during the same period.
In Between Two Armies in the Ixil
Towns of Guatemala, anthropologist
David Stoll has taken up the task of
giving a voice to some who were tar
gets o f the military’s scorched earth
policy. Stoll seeks to “rein terp ret
the recent history o f Ixil country in
a way m ore in accord with how the
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Walter Gillis Peacock is an associate
professor of sociology at Florida Interna
tional University. He is the co-author
(with Frederick L. Bates) of Living
Conditions, Disasters, and Devel
opm ent: An A pproach to CrossCultural Com parisons (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1993).
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inhabitants talk about it” (p. xiii).
He also wants to remove the ro
m antic surrealism he finds so prev
alent in the scholarly literature on
guerrilla insurgencies and revolu
tionary movements, which, along
with the solidarity and hum an
rights movements, is influenced by
“left-wing mythology.” He ques
tions the prevalent “reinterpreta
tions” o f the G uatem alan holocaust
and its characterization that use
term s like “oppression,” “rebellion,”
and “resistance.”

peared and did no t interview any of
the m ore than 12,000 Ixils living in
“com m unities of population in re
sistance,” Stoll m aintains th at his
data provide insight into why the
military won the war, why the revo
lutionary m ovem ent failed in the
western highlands in particular,
and “how outsiders project their
agendas into peasant populations,
how political violence emerges, and
how non-com batants respond to it”
in Guatem ala and o th er parts of
the world (p. 14).

The Scorched Earth Policy

Stoll wants to
remove the romantic
surrealism he finds
so prevalent in the
literature on guerrilla
insurgencies.

In attem pting to find the “voices”
o f the Ixil, Stoll worked in areas
controlled by the G uatem alan mili
tary in and around the towns of
Chajul, Cotzal, and Nebaj, where
he lived from O ctober 1988 to Sep
tem ber 1989. He interviewed vil
lage representatives, “religious
leaders, labor contractors, and
o th er groups o f interest,” and sur
veyed 164 Ixil leaders or entrepre
neurs and 98 household heads in
an outlying neighborhood o f Nebaj
that “absorbed many refugees from
destroyed aldeas [villages]” (p. 13).
While acknowledging potential se
lectivity bias because he could not
interview any of the tens o f thou
sands who had been killed or disap

After listening to these voices,
Stoll’s conclusions challenge revi
sionist accounts o f the violence that
hold that it was yet an o th er in the
long history of attem pts by high
land Indians to improve themselves
and assert their hum an rights, and
of brutal attacks by the military to
suppress those popular movements.
As Stoll notes, “to discourage Ixil
farm ers for helping the guerrillas,
the army b u rn ed down all ham lets
and hom esteads outside the three
towns. At first in reaction to guer
rilla am bushes, then by plan, army
units shot, hacked, o r b u rn ed to
death thousands o f unarm ed m en,
women, and children” (p. 4). For
Stoll, the entire blam e for the
arm y’s scorched earth policy and
unspeakable brutality must be laid
squarely at the feet of the Ejercito
Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP).
He m aintains “the only reason the
army attacked Ixils was to get at the
EGP” (p. 20).
Furtherm ore, he suggests that
the EGP was neither a popular n or
indigenous m ovem ent th at cap
tured the aspirations o f Ixils, sug
gesting instead the existence o f a
“gap between revolutionary politics

0

on the national level and the poli
tics o f the western highlands, that
is, between the ladino-dom inated
Left and Mayan Indians” (p. 89).
While the EGP was operating in
Ixil country in the early 1970s, Stoll
discounts Ixil involvement as lim
ited, consisting o f only “m ilitants”
and disillusioned radical students.
It was “only after EGP military units
appeared, am bushed soldiers, and
provoked wider reprisals against
the population did thousands of
Ixils jo in their revolutionary move
m ent, to protect themselves from
the army” (p. 88). Despite his own
reckoning that the majority o f EGP
com batants are Ixils, that they are
central to the com m and structure,
and that as m any as 17,000 Ixils
rem ain in EGP controlled areas,
the fact the EGP did no t spontane
ously arise am ong Ixils precludes its
claiming the label “p opular,” and,
in the final analysis, any claim of
legitimacy.

Defining Moment
Stoll’s analysis o f the violence is
quite narrow in both tem poral and
spatial considerations. While m en
tioning the history o f Indian sup
pression and th at the Ixils were
ruled by a police state, 1975 be
comes the defining m om ent, the
starting point, for his analysis be
cause it was the year of the first EGP
raids. It appears th at Stoll considers
the state’s actions so out o f charac
ter, if n o t in form then certainly in
m agnitude, th at som ething m ust
have provoked its action. W hat
came before is o f little or no rele
vance in his analysis. In addition,
what occurred o r occurs outside the
confines o f Ixil country is o f little
relevance, except th at this b ound
ary defines the EGP as an external,

R

nonindigenous, and hence illegiti
m ate m ovem ent that corrupted the
Ixils. T he fact the military m ight
also be considered illegitimate by
the same criterion is no t considered
o r questioned.

Guatemala’s Indians
have not played
central roles in the
country’s revolutionary
movements.

Stoll is at his best within the
tem poral and spatial boundaries
that he sets. It has long been noted
that G uatem ala’s Indians have not
played central roles in revolutionary
movem ents and their use o f struc
tures originally im posed upon
them , such as the cofradia (relig
ious b ro therhood), to define their
own sphere o f control or “civil soci
ety” is also well docum ented. Stoll
has added to these them es by cap
turing how Ixils have responded to
“the violence by m anufacturing a
new kind o f neutralism for them 
selves and recreating institutional
space to make their own choice”
(p. 13). He docum ents the relation
ship between the military and re
m aining Ixils, the em ergence of
the civil patrols, the growth and
spread o f evangelical Protestantism,
and the use o f evangelicalism and
the civil patrols as m echanism s for
establishing a reform ulated civil
society. F urtherm ore, his accounts
o f the ebb and flow of Ixil support

U

M

for the EGP and the perspectives of
Ixils u n d er military control should
be read by all students o f revolu
tion and social movements.

Multiple Realities
Conversely Stoll is at his worst in
placing the violence o f Ixil country
in the larger historical and contem 
porary setting o f Guatemala. In per
haps the m ost poignant statem ent
that captures both the strengths
and weaknesses o f the book, Stoll
notes, “While Ixils . . . have n o t
adopted the army’s point o f view,
they do accept its definition o f what
is possible . . . because it is corrobo
rated by their own experience of
the realities o f power” (p. 164).
Stoll has done an impressive jo b of
connecting us with the realities of
Guatemala, from the perspective of
the Ixils who have rem ained or re
turned (either by force or choice)
to the “old law” o f an oppressive
state. N onetheless, as social scien
tists, can o r should we stop there?
In the world o f m ultiple realities,
all o f which are shaped by social
forces, Stoll’s acceptance o f this
single world view results in large
elem ents o f his book seemingly
apologizing for the G uatem alan
military. T he military— through its
dom ination o f rem aining Ixils—
has defined for Stoll n o t only what
is possible, bu t the justification for
eradicating tens o f thousands of
m en, women, and children. The
legitimacy o f the military is never
questioned; it is a given.
The Nicaraguan revolution, the
massive infusion o f developm ent
program s into the highlands follow
ing the 1976 earthquake, and the
removal o f political restraints by
the Reagan adm inistration are but
a few o f the o th er factors that m ust
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be considered when addressing the
violence in the western highlands
of Guatemala. For example, the
military was fearful that the suc
cesses o f the Sandinistas—which
followed a m ajor natural disaster
like G uatem ala’s—would be played
o u t again, this time in Guatemala.
Following the earthquake, state of
ficials, unable to m eet massive re
construction and em ergency needs
and u n d er foreign pressure to avoid
a repeat o f Somoza’s extraordinary
corruption and ineptitude, granted
international agencies a free hand
at establishing their program s. T hat
free han d was severed by the mili
tary coup of the early 1980s, and
its im prints were being wiped out
th ro u g h o u t the highlands and the
city as developm ent program s were
forced to close and grassroots re
construction com m ittees were tar
geted for death. Clearly the EGP
and Ixil country were targeted for
particularly brutal attention in part
because the EGP represented a visi

ble threat and was symbolic o f the
state’s loss o f control. Yet it was but
part o f a wave of oppression and
destruction that occurred through
out the country. For Stoll to lay the
blam e exclusively at the feet o f the
EGP is an extraordinarily short
sighted oversimplification.

The Chiapas Comparison
This review is being written at the
same time that the Mexican gov
ern m en t is negotiating with the Za
patista guerrillas in Chiapas, ju st
across the border from Guatemala.
Many o f the same argum ents voiced
by Stoll are being heard, such as
that the Zapatistas are no t really an
indigenous group, that their lead
ers are no t really Indians, and that
they do no t represent Indian as
pirations. I am sure Stoll would
question the characterization of
the Zapatistas as a “po p u lar” force.
Prior to the success o f their January
1 military action, it probably would

have been difficult to find over
whelm ing popular support for the
guerrillas am ong Indians; 10 years
from now one may well have dif
ficulty finding a majority that
supported the Zapatistas, except
am ong “m ilitants,” “ex-combatants,” or “disillusioned radicals.”
It is doubtful, however, th at many
will question the legitimacy o f the
Zapatista claims.
L et’s hope that an apologetic
account of why tens o f thousands
of innocent m en, women, and chil
dren were killed, ju st so the mili
tary could “get at” the Zapatista
guerrillas, will no t need to be writ
ten. The Mexican state is no stran
ger to the use o f military force.
Still, the fact that M exico’s state
leadership derives its legitimacy
from popular and revolutionary
ideology m eans that political and
social reform is likely to play a
m uch greater role in state-Indian
relations in Chiapas than it has in
Guatemala. ■

A MAJOR CHARITABLE GIFT OPPORTUNITY FOR THE RIGHT PHILANTHROPIST
The MEDICAL, EYE & DENTAL INTERNATIONAL CARE ORGANIZATION, Inc., an independent 501 (c)3
organization based in Austin, Texas, has sent 274 volunteers from throughout the United States to
remote areas of Central Am erica providing free health, dental and vision care to nearly 20,000
poverty stricken children, men and women. Since being chartered in August of 1990, members of
twenty M.E.D.I.C.O. teams have spent one week of their time, sharing their concern and talents at
their own expense. M.E.D.I.C.O. has been recognized by Honduran governm ent and m edical
authorities as a significant contributor in their nation's health care program. M.E.D.I.C.O. has seven
teams scheduled for 1993, including two special surgical teams.
To date, M.E.D.I.C.O. has been administered by volunteers. The growth and success of the
program now requires the services of a full-time administrator and an endow m ent to financially
support this position.
The founders and volunteers of M.E.D.I.C.O. invite contributions from major potential donors to help
underwrite the operational costs of this much needed and expanding program. With a proven
track record, the opportunity to b e an integral part of a heartwarm ing successful hum anitarian
foundation is very real.

M.E.D.I.C.Gi
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For More Information, Contact:
Norm Peters, Chairman, Board of Directors
M.E.D.I.C.O., Inc.
1107 Main Street, Georgetown, Texas 78626
Telephone (512) 863-8217 or fax (512) 863-8666.

Love-Death among the Guerrillas
by David Stoll

B rid g e o f C o u rag e : L ife S tories
o f th e G u a te m a la n C o m p a n e ro s
a n d C o m p a n e ra s
byJennifer Harbury. Monroe, Me.:
Common Courage Press, 1993.
n Septem ber 1992 a N orth
Am erican lawyer w ent on a
week-long h u n g er strike out
side an army base in Guate
mala City. Arm ed with a novel,
Jen n ifer H arbury cam ped in
front o f a grim fortress where se
cret prisoners are said to ro t in u n 
derg ro u n d cells. Inspections o f the
interior yielded nothing, but H ar
bury, like thousands o f o th er wom
en in Guatemala, wanted to know
what the army had done with her
husband.
H arbury’s spouse is one of
thousands o f Guatemalans who,
since the late 1960s, have “disap
p eared ” in the hands o f the coun
try’s security forces. Efrafn Bamaca
Velasquez—better known as “Com andante Everardo”—belonged to
the O rganizacion del Pueblo en
Armas (ORPA), one of four small
guerrilla armies in the U nion Revolucionaria Nacional Guatem alteca
(URNG). The struggle dates back
to 1954, when the CIA overthrew
an elected governm ent challenging
US interests. Ever since, Guatemala
has been dom inated by its army,
and N orth Americans drawn to this
C entral A m erican country have
struggled with a p rofound sense of
guilt. Some o f us have em barked
on political journeys like H arbury’s.
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David Stoll, an anthropologist, is the
author o f Between Two Armies in
the Ixil Towns o f Guatem ala (Co
lumbia University Press, 1993).

A Harvard law school graduate
from Texas, she is far from the first
gringo to becom e rom antically in
volved with a Central Am erican rev
olution. But she may be the first to
have written a book about h er ex
periences, and it is a candid one.
Mainly a collection o f testimonials
from active and form er com batants,
Bridge of Courage leaves readers with
powerful impressions o f how brutal
the security forces can be, and of
the courage required to oppose
them . I was left with an additional
reaction, however, because o f my
experience with a different slice of
G uatem alan life than the one in
which H arbury im m ersed herself.
For m e as an anthropologist, the
stories in the book call into ques
tion the ethics o f guerrilla warfare.

Harbury is fa r from
the first gringo to
become romantically
involved with a
Central American
revolution.
O f m ounting raids and then dis
appearing, blurring the distinction
between com batants and civilians,
so that those who rem ain behind
to face the army’s rage are bewil
dered bystanders. O f setting up
front groups that implicate wider
circles o f people, many o f them un
knowing. O f dem anding civil guar
antees from the same system you
are trying to overthrow through
arm ed struggle. And o f continuing
the war in the face o f what I and

many o th er observers (although
no t Harbury) take to be widespread
popular disillusion with it.

“Bodyguard” on the Edge
H arbury’s first contact with Guate
mala was working with illegal im
migrants petitioning for political
asylum in the US. Frustrated by ju 
dicial rejection o f h er clients, she
went to Guatem ala to track down
hum an rights testimony for them .
Before long, Harbury was also an un
arm ed “bodyguard” for G uatem a
lans in danger o f being kidnapped,
and this soon led to contacts with
the clandestine support networks
of ORPA. T hat is, she was on the
periphery o f one o f the un d er
ground military organizations
whose activities have, for nearly
30 years, strengthened the Guate
m alan army’s rationale for building
up a national security state.
At first, H arbury collected the
stories o f guerrilla cadres who sur
vived the arm y’s destruction of
their urban safehouses, and o f hu
m an rights activists being tracked
down by the army with equal m erci
lessness. T heir m em ories were so
heart-rending that she headed for
the m ountains to interview com bat
ants. It was during these visits that
she m et one o f the first Mam Ma
yan Indians to jo in ORPA, Comandante Everardo, whom she m arried
only m onths before he disappeared
am id a fire fight in M arch 1992.
W hen Harbury dem anded to know
what had happened to h er hus
band, the army claim ed he had
killed him self to avoid capture—a
no t implausible scenario as many
guerrillas had opted for suicide
over capture. But H arbury was de
term ined to confirm this claim and
pressed to have his body exhum ed.
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T he body turned out to be some
o ne else’s. Meanwhile, an escaped
p risoner rep o rted seeing a severely
battered Everardo at an army base
where captured guerrillas are “re
p rogram m ed” to jo in governm ent
death squads.
H ence, it is n o t surprising that
H arbury’s campaign to make the
army observe the Geneva conven
tions has gotten a warm response
from many Guatemalans. But is
H arbury correct when stating that
many Guatem alans want the URNG
to keep fighting? And is supporting
arm ed struggle the only alternative
for the G uatem alan left, as she also
seems to assume?
C onsider for a m om ent the case
o f Santiago Atitlan, a town that
used to be a hotbed o f ORPA re
cruiting in the early 1980s. To
defend themselves from army
depredations, in 1990 the Atitecos
forced the army to close its base.
T hen they asked ORPA to stay away,
too. T heir success in mobilizing
hum an rights support, and the
growing presence o f hum an rights
activists like Harbury, suggests that
guerrilla warfare is no t the only
option for Guatemalans.
Contrary to the claim m ade by
H arbury and others that repression
is getting worse, the army has, in
fact, been forced to scale back its
abuses u n d er the weight o f dom es
tic as well as international pressure.
D uring a constitutional crisis in
1992, the officer corps divided, per
m itting the election o f G uatem ala’s
h um an rights om budsm an as presi
dent. While President Ramiro de
Leon Carpio has been forced to
acquiesce to army dem ands since
then, new groups dem anding their
rights continue to em erge from
civil society.
No do u b t because of H arbury’s
harsh experiences—she describes
the death of one friend after an
o th er—h er book fails to acknow
ledge how G uatem ala has changed
since the early 1980s, instead sub
m erging im portant issues in the po
ten t image o f the love-death. T he
reasons go beyond h er own tragic
union with C om andante Everardo,

H em isp h ere • W inter/Spring 1994

and probably beyond anything you
will find in the scholarly literature
on guerrilla movements.
Long ago ORPA stopped trying
to ban rom antic love am ong its mil
itants, many o f whom are women.
If H arbury’s stories are represen
tative, as I believe they are, love—
comradely as well as rom antic—has
been one o f the m ainsprings of rev
olutionary m ovem ent, sharpened
by the probability that courtships
and friendships will end in early
death. Again and again, H arbury
tells the story o f a rom ance cut
short by sacrifice for the revolution,
the m ost recent being that o f her
husband. As for the friendships that
ended this way, they are countless.

Love—comradely as
well as romantic—
has been a
mainspring of
revolutionary
movement, creating
a martyr’s mythology.

Like nothing else I have read,
H arbury’s stories explain why mili
tants accept the probability o f an
early and often horrible demise.
But solidarity activists should be
ware o f the resulting ideology of
m artyrdom that pervades both the
guerrilla armies o f the URNG and
the popular organizations allied
with them . T he living feel an obli
gation to continue the arm ed strug
gle that has taken so many o f their
com rades, bu t martyrs can no
longer speak, and their m em ory
can be used to avoid reassessing
strategies that they m ight now want
to change.
Yet, what if H arbury is right, that
broad masses o f Guatem alans sup

port guerrilla warfare, b u t are sim
ply afraid to say how they feel? Af
ter all, understanding how people
feel in a repressed society is n o t an
easy task. My own approach, as a re
searcher rath er than an activist,
was to live in a Mayan area th at was
a guerrilla stronghold at the start
o f the 1980s. This area was harshly
repressed by the army and now
claims to be neutral.
How do I know if my sources tell
me how they really feel? T here is
no way to know with absolute cer
tainty, but the willingness of so
many o f them to dam n both the
army and the guerrillas convinced
me that, when they say they want
the war to stop as soon as possible,
I have to take their statem ents at
face value. T he cost of protracted
war is too im m ediate and the hypo
thetical benefits of lengthy negotia
tions too rem ote for people whose
daily struggle to exist continues to
be com plicated by the URNG as
well as the army.
Outside the organized left, it is
easier to find Guatem alans who
place their hopes in em igration to
the US, or personal religious con
version, or even international h u 
m an rights observers, than in
heroic figures like C om andante
Everardo. O ne reason is that, when
guerrillas draw soldiers in h o t p ur
suit, they often failed to protect
civilians from the arm y’s reprisals.
Survivors get their “consciousness
raised,” but this includes the reali
zation that, had the guerrillas
never appeared, their loved ones
would probably still be alive.
Significantly, H arbury’s voices
are all from the revolutionary van
guard, no t from the many bystand
ers who never asked the guerrillas
to attack the army on their door
step and who have suffered so
many o f the casualties. As a result,
h er testimonies fail to capture the
many nuances o f suspicion and an
ger as well as sympathy th at n o n 
activists feel toward the guerrillas.
Guerrillaphile N orth Americans
(including myself, until recently)
need to recognize that casting o n e ’s
lot with a guerrilla m ovem ent

makes it h ard er to see how little
support there often is for it—if no t
in the full flush o f revolutionary
mobilization, then later as arm ed
struggle becom es as interm inable
as trench warfare.
In all o f Latin America, only
Colombia has bled from a longer
civil war, and there the left is deep
ly divided over w hether to continue
arm ed struggle. Unfortunately, this
debate has yet to com e ou t o f the
closet on the G uatem alan left, even
though the guerrillas are too weak
to extract significant concessions
from the army and vow to continue
fighting until they do—hence the
ever-stalemated peace talks that,
since 1991, have failed to produce
an agreem ent.

Unarmed Scapegoats
Meanwhile, URNG am bushes do
no t increase the G uatem alan secu
rity forces’ respect for the law. To
the contrary, guerrilla attacks
strengthen army hard-liners who
oppose m aking any concessions to
the left. W hen there was no chance
o f extracting due process from the
out-of-control military dictatorships
o f the 1970s and early 1980s, this
may n o t have been so im portant.
But now th at m ore political space
has op en ed up, arm ed struggle re
inforces the G uatem alan arm y’s
rationale for dom inating national
life. W hen guerrillas attack the
army in proxim ity to peaceful pro
tests, unarm ed activists becom e en
dangered scapegoats.
Unlike Harbury, I do no t believe
the URNG has gained m uch ground
in the last three years o f peace talks.
Even though the URNG has prob
ably given m ore gro u nd than the
governm ent, both sides have come
to look intransigent. Occasionally,
my Mayan interviewees w onder if
the two sides are working together
to keep everyone else under the gun.
T hat peace talks started at all
was due less to URNG’s domestic
strength than to international pres
sure on the governm ent. U nfortu
nately, international pressure has
been unable to break the para

doxical convergence o f interests
between the two arm ed groups.
Subversion justifies a counterinsur
gency state, and the arm y’s hum an
rights abuses justify the URNG’s
arm ed resistance. Each side’s activi
ties provide powerful rationales for
the o th e r’s, perm itting both to im
pose their priorities on the rest of
the society, m uch o f which does
no t feel represented by either.
T he Mayan peasants with whom
I talk cannot see the point o f the
URNG continuing the war, and as
a result neither can I. Giving up
the arm ed struggle for little in re
turn may still be unthinkable for
m ost o f the G uatem alan left, but if
it ever wants to organize broadly
again, it may have to do ju st that.
C aptured guerrillas like Com an
dante Everardo have every right to
international safeguards. H arbury’s
campaign is a courageous one that
deserves the support o f the larger
hum an rights community. She has
increased international pressure
on the army by publicizing how it
treats its prisoners. Yet, now that

m ore political space exists, activists
cannot ignore the contradictions
between working for hum an rights
and supporting arm ed struggle—
that is, dem anding that a govern
m ent respect due process while
implicitly supporting arm ed attacks
on its agents.
Bridge of Courage suggests the
close ties that can develop between
hum an rights work and support for
a guerrilla movement, and how in
ternational activism can becom e a
substitute for grassroots domestic
support. Guatem alans want their
rights and deserve m ore in terna
tional support than they are get
ting. It is im portant, however, to
discern between the dem and for
hum an rights as a plea for due
process and the call for those same
rights as a justification for an insur
gency that is going nowhere. ■

Editor’s Note: The “Where is Everardo?”
campaign can be contacted at P. O. Box
650054, Austin, Texas 78765; (512)
473-7149.
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Chiapas in the Wider World
by Marian Goslinga

he unexpected em ergence o f an arm ed insurrection in Mexico on January 1, 1994— the first day the
N orth Am erican Free T rade A greem ent went into effect—has brought to the fore no t only the growing
vulnerability and the loss of legitimacy o f M exico’s ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional but also the
limits of popular tolerance for econom ic reform . N am ed for Emiliano Zapata—the legendary figure of the
Mexican revolution who fought for land reform and campesino rights u n d er the ban n er “Tierra o libertad”—
the Ejercito Zapatista de L iberation Nacional is primarily m ade up o f peasants who are dem anding a host
of dem ocratic reforms.
T he state o f Chiapas is the poorest and most backward in Mexico. According to the 1990 census, 26% o f the state’s
3.2 million inhabitants speak no Spanish and identify themselves as Indians rath er than as Mexicans. To restore peace
and a sense o f national unity, the Mexican governm ent m ust not only im plem ent social and political reform s in Chia
pas but extend the reform s on a national basis.
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